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  INTRODUCTION   
Medical spending is the fiscal analogue of global warming. 
Anger over rising insurance premiums, drug prices, and bills 
from doctors and hospitals infuses our politics. Federal outlays 
on health care are projected to soar, from 28% to 40% of federal 
spending by 2047,1 pushing public borrowing to levels that por-
tend fiscal crisis.2 Within ten years, national debt is projected to 
approach or exceed 100% of gross domestic product (GDP),3 a 
marker associated in other countries with investor panic, spik-
ing interest rates, and more general economic meltdown.4 
Fear of uncontrolled medical costs has fueled resistance to 
the Affordable Care Act (ACA),5 stymied Medicaid expansion in 
some states,6 and discouraged employers from offering medical 
 
 1. Jessica Banthin, Health Care Spending Today and in the Future: 
Impacts on Federal Deficits and Debt, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (July 18, 2017), 
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/presentation/ 
52913-presentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP7K-LL9A] (detailing percent-
ages of federal spending exclusive of interest payment on the national debt). 
 2. Michael J. Boskin et al., A Debt Crisis Is on the Horizon, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-debt-crisis-is 
-on-our-doorstep/2018/03/27/fd28318c-27d3-11e8-bc72-077aa4dab9ef_story 
.html?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/XJ6Y-WKYR]. 
 3. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECON. OUTLOOK: 2018 to 
2028, 86 (2018), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-04/53651-outlook-2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/33ZU-MJ3S]. We use “Debt Held by the Public” as our metric 
of national debt; it includes all federal debt held by people or firms, state or local 
governments, Federal Reserve Banks, and foreign entities. 
 4. Absent rising medical spending, America’s debt would stabilize as a 
fraction of GDP, climbing slowly from 77% in 2018 to 90% in 2028, then slipping 
to 87% in 2040, according to Congressional Budget Office projections. But if cur-
rent health spending trends continue, public debt will soar to 125% of GDP by 
2040. American Health Care: Health Spending and the Federal Budget, COM-
MITTEE FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET (May 14, 2018), https://www.crfb.org/ 
papers/american-health-care-health-spending-and-federal-budget [https:// 
perma.cc/CBT7-YM2T]. 
 5. Paul R. Gordon et al., Opposition to Obamacare: A Closer Look, 92 
ACAD. MED. 1241 (2017). 
 6. See Robert Pear & Michael Cooper, Reluctance in Some States Over 
Medicaid Expansion, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/06/30/us/politics/some-states-reluctant-over-medicaid-expansion.html 
[https://perma.cc/E5SE-TRXX]; Tami Luhby, States Forgo Billions by Opting 
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coverage.7 Meanwhile, rising premiums8 and out-of-pocket costs9 
are stressing families and fomenting anger at health plans, doc-
tors and hospitals, and elected officials.10 
For more than seventy years, since the spread of employ-
ment-based medical insurance during World War II, U.S. medi-
cal spending has risen more rapidly than our country’s GDP.11 
There have been brief breaks from this pattern, coinciding with 
 
 7. See Laura Lorenzetti, This Workplace Perk Is Slowly Going Extinct, 
FORTUNE (Mar. 30, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/03/30/employer-paid-health 
-insurance-is-dying-off/ [https://perma.cc/L7DG-LD7B]; Robert King, Study: 
Fewer Employers Offering Health Insurance, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 22, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/study-fewer-employers-offering-health 
-insurance [https://perma.cc/3ERA-YJ83]. 
 8. Premiums for benchmark “Silver” plans on the ACA’s Insurance Ex-
changes increased by an average of 20% in 2016. John Holahan et al., What 
Explains the 21 Percent Increase in 2017 Marketplace Premiums, and Why Do 
Increases Vary Across the Country?, URB. INST. (Jan. 2017), https://www.urban 
.org/sites/default/files/publication/87021/2001052-what-explains-the-21 
-percent-increase-in-2017-marketplace-premiums-and-why-do-increases-vary 
-across-the-country_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/39YP-42BH]. Individual-market 
premiums have more recently risen more slowly, albeit with wide local varia-
tions. Rabah Kamal et al., 2019 Premium Changes on ACA Exchanges, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/ 
tracking-2019-premium-changes-on-aca-exchanges/ [https://perma.cc/S7ZC 
-W7G3]. Average annual price increases for employment-based coverage have 
remained in the single digits for the last several years, but they’ve typically 
outpaced the general rate of inflation by a few to several percentage points. Gary 
Claxton et al., Health Benefits in 2018: Modest Growth in Premiums, Higher 
Worker Contributions at Firms with More Low-Wage Workers, 37 HEALTH AFF. 
1892 (2018); 2017 Employer Health Benefits Survey, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 
19, 2017), https://www.kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2017-summary-of-findings/ 
[https://perma.cc/5V89-LNAD]. 
 9. Gary Claxton et al., Increases in Cost-Sharing Payments Continue to 
Outpace Wage Growth, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (June 15, 2018), https://www 
.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/increases-in-cost-sharing-payments-have-far 
-outpaced-wage-growth/ [https://perma.cc/FA2H-GE7Q]. 
 10. Consumer Attitudes on Health Care Costs: Insights from Focus Groups 
in Four Cities, Anger and Confusion as Rising Premiums and High Deductibles 
Claim a Bigger Share of Household Budgets, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. 
(Jan. 2013), https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2013/ 
rwjf403428 [https://perma.cc/D938-DYYQ]; Helaine Olen, Even the Insured Of-
ten Can’t Afford Their Medical Bills, ATLANTIC (June 18, 2017), https://www 
.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/06/medical-bills/530679/ [https://perma 
.cc7V4V-6KHT]. 
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steep recessions12 and one-off changes in health care payment 
practice.13 But the long-term trend line has been steadily up-
ward, toward nearly 18% of GDP by 2017.14 After several years 
of deceptive stability in the wake of the Great Recession,15 health 
spending rose by 3.7 percentage points more than general infla-
tion16 in 2014, then by 5.8% more in 2015.17 For 2016 to 2025, 
the federal government projects further increases averaging 
5.6% per year (not adjusted for inflation)—1.2 percentage points 
beyond annual GDP growth—pushing health spending to one 
fifth of GDP by the end of this period.18 Longer-term projections, 
 
 12. Medical spending stayed flat, as a portion of GDP, for several years dur-
ing and after the deep recessions of 1980–1981 and 2008–2009. Louise Sheiner, 
Perspectives on Health Spending Growth, FED. RESERVE BOARD. OF GOVER-
NORS (Apr. 11, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ 
411_Health_Care_Spending_Deck_ALL-PANELS.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6LK 
-V32G]. 
 13. See Stuart Guterman & Allen Dobson, Impact of the Medicare Prospec-
tive Payment System for Hospitals, 7 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 3 (1986) (describ-
ing how Medicare’s 1983 shift from fee-for-service payment for hospital care to 
payment based on diagnostic category led to shorter hospitalizations and other 
spending reductions for both Medicare and non-Medicare patients); AARON CAT-
LIN & CATHY COWAN, HISTORY OF HEALTH SPENDING IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1960–2013 (2015), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and 
-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/ 
Downloads/HistoricalNHEPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK8W-PQJK]  
(documenting another plateau in health spending as a proportion of GDP in the 
mid-1990s, associated with many employers’ shift from fee-for-service to more 
frugal “managed care” plans for their employees). 
 14. Andrea M. Sisko et al., National Health Expenditure Projections, 2018-
27: Economic and Demographic Trends Drive Spending and Enrollment 
Growth, 38 HEALTH AFF. 491 (2019) (reporting that total U.S. private and public 
health care spending reached 17.9% of GDP in 2017 and projecting a further 
rise to 19.4% by 2027, based on CMS data and assumptions). 
 15. See CATLIN & COWAN, supra note 13 (documenting health spending that 
stayed approximately flat as a percentage of GDP during and immediately after 
the “Great Recession”). 
 16. Historical Inflation Rates: 1914-2019, U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, 
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/historical-inflation-rates/ 
[https://perma.cc/47PH-VFS7]. 
 17. NHE Factsheet, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (2017), 
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends 
-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet.html [https://perma.cc/ 
HLE6-ZZEN]. We subtracted the 2014 and 2015 general inflation rates from 
each year’s health spending increase to obtain the percentages in the text above. 
 18. Id. CMS projects that national health spending will be 19.9% of GDP in 
2025. CMS issues annual ten-year projections that vary slightly as assumptions 
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typically less reliable, call for medical spending to surpass 30% 
of GDP by mid-century.19 
Medical costs pose a mounting threat to our country’s fiscal 
stability, crowd out other pressing public needs, and are a grow-
ing burden on businesses and families.20 Employers experience 
this burden in the form of the rising proportions of total operat-
ing expenses they must budget to cover employees’ health care 
costs, either directly21 or through purchase of insurance. Individ-
uals feel it in the form of rising premiums, copayments, and de-
ductibles that reduce their standards of living and ability to in-
vest in their futures. 
Ever-increasing medical costs, moreover, stand in the way 
of efforts to expand access to care. Soaring premiums for cover-
age sold on ACA Insurance Exchanges22 soured millions on the 
ACA’s access-expanding potential.23 Insurers’ efforts to con-
strain premiums by narrowing their provider networks24 and 
raising subscribers’ cost-sharing burdens25 further diminished 
 
evolve and data are updated; in February 2019, the agency projected that health 
spending would rise to 19.4% of GDP by 2027. Sisko et al., supra note 14. 
 19. Stephen Heffler et al., The Long-Term Projection Assumptions for Med-
icare and Aggregate National Health Expenditures, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVICES. (Nov. 27, 2012), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics 
-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/ReportsTrustFunds/ 
Downloads/ProjectionMethodology2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/47MD-U29M]. 
 20. Rising Medicare costs are the main factor in long-term projections of 
mounting federal budget deficits. The 2018 Long-Term Budget Outlook, CONG. 
BUDGET OFF. (June 2018), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files?file=2018-06/53919 
-2018ltbo.pdf [https://perma.ccJ9QJ-Y92J] The federal government’s failure to 
gain long-term control of Medicare costs was the main reason Standard and 
Poor’s gave for its 2011 downgrading of U.S. sovereign debt from AAA to AA+, 
a downgrade that still stands. Charles Riley, S&P Downgrades U.S. Credit Rat-
ing, CNN (Aug. 6, 2011), https://money.cnn.com/2011/08/05/news/economy/ 
downgrade_rumors/index.htm [https://perma.cc/5L9N-F9P7]. 
 21. Larger employers tend to “self-insure”—an industry euphemism for set-
ting aside funds to cover employees’ medical costs without purchasing insur-
ance. 
 22. See supra note 8. 
 23. Vladimir Kogan & Thomas J. Wood, Obamacare Implementation and 
the 2016 Election (Feb. 6, 2019), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3075406 [https:// 
perma.cc/H8HQ-GHZF]. 
 24. Austin Frakt, Savings? Yes. But Narrow Health Networks Also Show 
Troubling Signs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
10/18/upshot/savings-yes-but-narrow-health-networks-also-show-troubling 
-signs.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/434D-EBVG]. 
 25. Health Policy Brief: High-Deductible Health Plans, HEALTH AFF. (Feb. 
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the ACA as a value proposition in the eyes of many,26 perhaps 
playing a role in Donald Trump’s electoral victory on a platform 
that included the law’s repeal.27 And apprehension over uncon-
trolled costs has discouraged states from expanding Medicaid28 
and fed resistance to funding the ACA’s cost-sharing reductions 
for lower-income health insurance purchasers. 
Many factors influence health spending, including coverage 
expansion, the balance of bargaining power between payers and 
providers, and the aging of America’s population. But the main 
driving force behind rising spending, long-term, is technological 
advance, fueled by health insurance’s promise of rich reward.29 
If this advance delivered value commensurate with its oppor-
tunity costs, we could celebrate it as unalloyed accomplishment; 
it’s the market distortion induced by insurers’ coverage of health 
care prices at the point of purchase that creates large potential 
for waste. 
Here, the health law and policy literature mostly misses a 
critical point. This literature is replete with references to “moral 
hazard”—health insurance’s tendency to induce wasteful spend-
ing by reducing the prices patients pay out-of-pocket for care. 
But the more important, long-term effect of medical insurance 
on health care costs is dynamic: the expected availability of cov-
erage for future advances—even those that yield only small in-
cremental benefits—spurs technological innovation with little 
regard for therapeutic value and minimal concern about price.30 
 
4, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/ 
healthpolicybrief_152.pdf [https://perma.cc/PT58-R6LV]. 
 26. Sarah Kliff, Why Obamacare Enrollees Voted for Trump, VOX (Dec. 13, 
2016), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2016/12/13/13848794/kentucky 
-obamacare-trump [https://perma.cc/K6PH-XE9U]. 
 27. Id.; Kogan & Wood, supra note 23. 
 28. Kimberly Leonard, Opposing Medicaid Expansion, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 4, 
2015), https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2015/12/04/opposing 
-medicaid-expansion [https://perma.cc/RQ88-DGSF]. 
 29. HENRY AARON, SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE CONDITION 24–27 (1991). 
 30. See id. (suggesting various tax reforms and changes to Medicare to ac-
complish this); see also NICHOLAS BAGLEY ET AL., THE HAMILTON PROJECT, DIS-
CUSSION PAPER 2015-09, CORRECTING SIGNALS FOR INNOVATION IN HEALTH 
CARE, (Oct. 2015), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/correcting_ 
signals_for_innovation_in_health_care_bagley.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU8J 
-9KTD] (“Addressing the incentives for technology development, and not just its 
diffusion once invented, is critical [for controlling health care costs.]”). 
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Since out-of-control clinical spending was first recognized as 
a problem in the mid-1960s, federal and state policymakers have 
tried to gain control of it via a wide array of regulatory and mar-
ket-oriented strategies.31 These efforts have uniformly failed. In 
this Article, we explain why. Our explanation breaks with tradi-
tional liberal and conservative accounts of this spending as the 
product of poorly-regulated industry actors, overly-intervention-
ist government, or some mix of both. Rather, we argue, America’s 
escalating failure to contain it is the product of an intractable 
tangle of human psychology, cultural mores, clinical ethics, and 
stakeholder expectations. 
Large legal and political obstacles to medical cost-contain-
ment both reflect and reinforce this phenomenon. Law, psychol-
ogy, culture, and industry actors’ embedded expectations ensure 
fulsome rewards for even tiny clinical advances. And once a test 
or treatment comes onto the market, this tangle of influences 
makes it nearly impossible for our health care system to say no 
if there’s a plausible case for some small therapeutic benefit. 
The legal and regulatory schemes that govern public and 
private health care payment and provision consign cost-benefit 
tradeoffs to the down-low. Health policy’s most dreaded word, 
“rationing,” is an equal-opportunity cudgel, wielded by Demo-
crats and Republicans, patients and providers, and drug and de-
vice makers to defeat such tradeoffs. Criticizing law’s obstacles 
to setting limits is easy and often done, from diverse ideological 
perspectives. But doing so begs the question of how to overcome 
the psychological, cultural, and institutional influences that hold 
these obstacles in place. 
Over the past fifty years, we contend below, no regulatory or 
market-oriented approach to medical costs has taken serious ac-
count of this Gordian knot of influences. Our central proposition 
in this Article is that the medical cost crisis that threatens Amer-
ica’s fiscal stability, consumer well-being, and competitiveness 
cannot be managed unless law and politics take on this chal-
lenge. 
In Part I, we explain how this Gordian tangle and the legal 
regimes that reinforce it have stymied cost-control efforts. We 
 
 31. Stuart Altman & Robert Mechanic, Health Care Cost Control: Where Do 
We Go from Here?, HEALTH AFF. (July 13, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs 
.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180705.24704/full/.  
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then review the record of failure, from the “health systems plan-
ning” movement of the late 1960s through “managed care” to re-
cent efforts to cap health care entitlement programs and to make 
patients more price-conscious by boosting co-payments and de-
ductibles. Though these strategies have sharply different ideo-
logical roots, they’ve failed for the same core reasons. 
In Part II, we urge a legal and regulatory strategy that fi-
nesses the forces behind this failure. We play the long game, by 
minimizing disruption of vested expectations and averting ar-
rangements that push patients and families into agonizing 
choices between catastrophic expense and forgoing potentially 
life-saving care. Instead, we aim to dramatically shift the trajec-
tory of innovation, away from the high-cost, low-value advances 
that play an outsized role in raising spending. 
To this end, we propose a novel reward system for innova-
tion tied to therapeutic value. We urge that prices for new clini-
cal measures be set, then continually adjusted, based on emerg-
ing evidence of efficacy. And we propose a fundamental change 
in the law’s treatment of intellectual property—a shift to varia-
ble patent terms (and other forms of market exclusivity) for med-
ical technologies, tied to evolving evidence of clinical value. This 
sharp break with one-size-fits-all market exclusivity outside the 
health sphere is urgently needed, we contend, because of the 
medical marketplace’s unique, enormous dysfunction—its ina-
bility to translate real value into economic reward. 
Finally, in Part III, we outline legal and regulatory changes 
needed to give effect to our vision for changing the trajectory of 
innovation. We first propose a scheme for valuing the efficacy of 
emerging diagnostic and therapeutic measures—a scheme that 
incorporates patients’ diverse concerns and draws upon large ad-
vances in information technology’s capacity to track and learn 
from real-world clinical outcomes. Next, we urge changes to the 
law governing health care payment so as to shift its basis from 
the cost of emerging services to their efficacy. Then, we offer a 
blueprint for a transformed regime of intellectual property pro-
tection in the health sphere, based on value. After sketching the 
outlines of an ideal regime, we identify practical reforms, build-
ing on the Hatch-Waxman Act and other current law, that would 
move health care intellectual property law in this direction. 
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The approach we urge here is feasible because it finesses 
stakeholders’ settled expectations. It changes industry actors’ in-
centives for research and development decisions they haven’t yet 
made, while leaving incentive schemes for already-made com-
mitments in place. It thus dramatically dials down development 
of the high-cost, low-benefit tests and treatments that are the 
main drivers of soaring spending. Our approach thereby 
achieves cost containment without putting payers, politicians, 
and physicians in the untenable position of often needing to say 
“no” to potentially life-prolonging measures. 
I. MEDICAL COST-CONTROL: FIFTY YEARS OF FAILURE 
Some contend that rising medical costs aren’t a problem. Be-
tween 1940 and 1990, economist Sherry Glied notes, declining 
spending on food almost exactly offset soaring spending on 
health care.32 In 1940, Americans devoted nearly 30% of house-
hold income to food and only a few percent to medical care.33 
Fifty years later, the fraction of income spent on food had fallen 
by half; health spending, meanwhile, had risen to fill this gap.34 
The larger point here is that household spending across different 
economic sectors fluctuates over time. Rapid growth in one sec-
tor isn’t necessarily an indicator of trouble; to the contrary, it’s 
often seen as a sign of vibrancy. By 2010, for example, infor-
mation and communications technology production had reached 
nearly 5% of U.S. GDP,35 up from less than 1% in 1980.36 
Americans embrace this as progress—a boost for both 
productivity and people’s satisfaction. And society defers to mar-
ket choice as the measure of value for $1,200 iPhones, $300 
ripped jeans, and most other products and services.37 Health 
 
 32. SHERRY GLIED, CHRONIC CONDITION: WHY HEALTH REFORM FAILS 
102–03 (1997). We were, of course, hardly eating less by 1990 than we were in 
1940, as the American obesity epidemic (which began in the 1980s) underscores. 
Rather, as Glied points out, the relative production costs of food fell. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.  
 35. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, CONTINUING INNOVATION IN INFORMATION TECH. 
(2012), https://www.nap.edu/read/13427/chapter/2 [https://perma.cc/9YRA 
-57JG]. 
 36. Ian Hathaway, How Big Is the Tech Sector? (May 31, 2017), http://www 
.ianhathaway.org/blog/2017/5/31/how-big-is-the-tech-sector [https://perma.cc/ 
9G5G-TNSV]. 
 37. True, product reviewers, cultural critics, and others question our con-
sumer choices, but we don’t typically marshal the law to enforce these doubts. 
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care, though, is different, since people for the most part don’t pay 
for it with their own money: 75% of the $3.5 trillion the nation 
spent on medical care in 2017 was covered by insurers.38 Insur-
ance, health economists hold, creates “moral hazard” by enabling 
patients to purchase care for a fraction of its actual cost.39 Waste 
ensues, this story says, when patients purchase services that 
they value at less than actual cost but more highly than their 
out-of-pocket payments. There are deep flaws in this standard 
story,40 but its core message is spot-on: by slashing consumers’ 
out-of-pocket prices, health insurance fuels the provision of med-
ical care at higher-than-optimal levels as physicians evolve clin-
ical standards that incorporate this distortion. More importantly 
over the long-term, insurance overstimulates investment in the 
development of new clinical technologies with low future bene-
fits, relative to their cost. 
The result is rising waste41 as health spending soars. Con-
sumer welfare suffers as medical insurance siphons resources, 
via premium payments, from higher-value uses (beyond the 
health sector) to low-benefit clinical services. Likewise, individ-
uals and businesses are less able to invest for the future—medi-
cal spending crowds out commitments of resources to education, 
research and development, and capital expenditures. Govern-
ments responsible for public insurance programs face an espe-
cially tight squeeze—between these programs’ rising costs and 
voters’ resistance to higher taxes. The result is the rerouting of 
 
 38. Sisko et al., supra note 14, at 492 Exhibit 1. Individuals pay for this, of 
course, in the form of taxes, insurance premiums, and (in the case of employees 
who obtain coverage through their workplaces) reduced wages; the point here is 
that patients aren’t hit with these costs when care is provided. 
 39. E.g., Martin S. Feldstein, Hospital Cost Inflation: A Study of Nonprofit 
Price Dynamics, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 853 (1971). 
 40. For a discussion (by one of us) of some of the moral-hazard story’s most 
worrisome defects, see M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL 
L. REV. 247, 260–66 (2003) (arguing that health economists invoke moral haz-
ard in a way that overstates “waste” by failing to account for the benefits (both 
tangible and psychological) of insurance as a safety net when health crises 
strike and that hides other normative questions about what should and 
shouldn’t count as waste). 
 41. We understand “waste” here in the economic sense, as an expenditure’s 
excess of cost (including opportunity cost) over benefit. 
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funds from other public programs to medical care, shortchanging 
myriad priorities, from education42 to national defense.43 
Moreover, some contend that America’s disproportionately 
high health spending, relative to other industrialized nations, 
undermines the global competitiveness of U.S. business by ele-
vating labor costs.44 This is a controversial proposition—others 
claim this effect is mythic because employers restrain wages to 
cover their workers’ medical costs, ensuring that total employee 
compensation is unaffected by health spending.45 But even if 
wages adjust without friction to fully account for medical costs, 
reduced consumer spending and public and private investment 
in education, research and development, and other productivity-
enhancing endeavors likely translates into diminished capacity 
to compete in global markets. 
Soaring health care costs thus pose a huge challenge to 
American fiscal stability and personal well-being. Why has the 
U.S. failed so utterly over the past half-century to meet this chal-
lenge? At the heart of the problem, we contend here, is the psy-
chological difficulty of withholding care that might save lives, 
ameliorate misery, or reduce disability. Doing so in the open in-
spires outrage—from patients, family and friends, and society at 
large.46 Cultural mores, clinical ethics, and law reflect and rein-
force this psychology. And stakeholders in the medical economy 
benefit from and entrench it as they pitch their products and 
press their interests through politics and law. This tangle of per-
sonal and social expectations, ethical and legal obligation, and 
stakeholder influence stymies efforts to say “no” to tests and 
treatments thought to offer even small benefits, regardless of 
cost. The history of medical cost-containment policy is a record 
of this recurring failure. 
 
 42. Douglas Webber, Higher Ed, Lower Spending, EDUC. NEXT (May 2, 
2018), https://www.educationnext.org/higher-ed-lower-spending-as-states-cut 
-back-where-has-money-gone/ [https://perma.cc/8MLW-QJ2R]. 
 43. Avik Roy, A Real Domestic Threat: How Health-Care Spending Strains 
the U.S. Military, ATLANTIC (Mar. 12, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
business/archive/2012/03/a-real-domestic-threat-how-health-care-spending 
-strains-the-us-military/254350/ [https://perma.cc/D94Y-T2TD]. 
 44. E.g., LESTER THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD: THE COMING ECONOMIC BATTLE 
AMONG JAPAN, EUROPE, AND AMERICA (rev. ed. 1994). 
 45. GLIED, supra note 32, at 107–08. 
 46. M. GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH 17–47 (2011). 
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A. “DON’T PULL THE PLUG ON GRANDMA”: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
RESCUE AND THE ETHICS OF MEDICINE 
In the film, Saving Private Ryan,47 the larger ends of Amer-
ica in World War II dissolve as an army platoon takes senseless 
risks to search for a missing comrade—senseless, that is, if one 
disregards the combat deaths of his three brothers. That this 
family catastrophe justifies General George C. Marshall’s order 
to his commanders to find Ryan and “get him the hell out of 
there” is the film’s central trope. Men die as this quest unfolds. 
The campaign against the Nazis takes a back seat. Yet the sol-
diers’ sacrifice seems ennobled by their mutual devotion.48  
More generally, we admire, even romanticize those who take 
great risks to save others, even when cold reason shows that 
these risks are disproportionate.49 And we marshal shared re-
sources to rescue people in dire circumstances even when cost-
benefit calculus commands the conclusion that these resources 
would make a larger social difference if spent on other pur-
poses.50 
1. Rescue and Clinical Spending 
We’re hard-wired to come to the aid of people we know are 
in distress, to admire those who make sacrifices to do so, and to 
scorn those who refrain.51 A large literature documents our de-
parture from the sensible ways of Homo Economicus as regards 
the distinctions we draw, through our actions, between identifi-
able and statistical lives—and between identified people’s con-
cerns and abstract purposes more generally.52 This departure 
drives our greater willingness to devote resources to rescue of 
identified individuals than to ex ante prevention of harm to 
them, even when the latter is much more cost-effective.  
 
 47. SAVING PRIVATE RYAN (Paramount Pictures 1998). 
 48. BLOCHE, supra note 46, at 54. 
 49. Id. at 55. 
 50. Id. at 38, 45–47. 
 51. Francis T. McAndrew, New Evolutionary Perspectives on Altruism: 
Multilevel-Selection and Costly-Signaling Theories, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS 
PSYCH. SCI. 79, 79–80 (2002). 
 52. E.g., Milan Zafirovski, Rational Choice Requiem: The Decline of an Eco-
nomic Paradigm and its Implications for Sociology, 45 AM. SOC’Y 432, 435 
(2018). 
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Health spending priorities express this preference. In the 
face of vast evidence that investment in public health and alle-
viation of poverty promote population-wide health much more 
cost-effectively than does rescue-oriented medical technology,53 
the U.S. and the rest of the world spend disproportionately on 
the latter—disproportionately, that is, relative to health out-
comes. 
It’s easy to say that we shouldn’t do this. Academic litera-
ture in multiple disciplines is replete with appeals to this effect. 
But the non-cognitive responses that incline us this way are part 
of who we are, and democratic and market mechanisms of social 
decision-making inevitably reflect them. Candidates for political 
office don’t run on promises to shut down surgical suites and in-
tensive care units (ICUs) to free up funds for public parks or ed-
ucation. And medical insurers don’t market plans that promise 
to better people’s lives by withholding access to desperate 
measures so they can invest, instead, in gym memberships or 
college. 
Physicians and hospitals deliver on these expectations. In 
emergencies, hospitals are legally obligated to do so even for pa-
tients who cannot pay: a 1986 statute conditions participation in 
Medicare on provision of emergency care to all.54 That this law 
singled out emergency, allowing hospitals to withhold less ur-
gent services, underscores the political priority of rescue. 
2. Clinical Ethics 
Medical ethics, as well, reflect and reinforce the priority of 
rescue—and, more generally, the priority of individuals, no mat-
ter the social burden. The Hippocratic ideal of uncompromising 
loyalty to patients drives physicians to disregard social costs and 
to weigh only the expected therapeutic benefits and risks of tests 
and treatments, so long as insurance covers the bulk of the fi-
nancial cost.55 Were patients responsible for all or most of this 
cost, the Hippocratic ethic would command consideration of their 
economic burdens, as part of the duty to keep an eye single to 
 
 53. Dhruv Khullar & Dave A. Chokshi, Health, Income, & Poverty, HEALTH 
AFF. (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20180817 
.901935/full/ [https://perma.cc/TUG4-R5NF]. 
 54. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 99-
272, 100 Stat. 164 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012)). 
 55. BLOCHE, supra note 46, at 46–47, 107–08. 
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patient well-being. By analogy, lawyers, bound by a similar pro-
fessional ethic of undivided loyalty to clients, are expected to ad-
just the services they provide to what their clients can afford.56 
But when insurers pay all or most of the full freight, stinting on 
care that could prolong life, preserve capabilities, or provide com-
fort, it compromises patients’ interests to benefit third-party bot-
tom lines. Once a test or treatment becomes state-of-the-art, eth-
ical practice bars withholding it based on cost. 
The medical marketplace reinforces this ethic. More than 
fifty years ago, Kenneth Arrow explained the Hippocratic ideal 
of devotion to patient well-being as “part of the commodity the 
physician sells.”57 This ethical commitment, Arrow argued, en-
hances demand for health care by reassuring patients who are 
squeamish about their medical ignorance. Physician trustwor-
thiness solves, or at least shrinks, the problem of information 
asymmetry between doctor and patient by signaling to prospec-
tive patients that physicians won’t exploit this asymmetry for 
personal gain.58 Arrow focused on patients’ worries about physi-
cian pursuit of financial gain, but the same argument applies to 
other breaches of loyalty, including stinting on care to save 
money for insurers.  
Arrow’s argument for information asymmetry as the source 
of patients’ yearning for professional trustworthiness is, we 
think, both persuasive and incomplete. It leaves out the affective 
dimension of this human need—patients’ craving for comfort and 
support through faith in their physicians.59 
 
 56. Michelle S. Jacobs, Legal Professionalism: Do Ethical Rules Require 
Zealous Representation for Poor People?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 97 (1995). Insur-
ance for the cost of legal services is unusual, though commercial liability cover-
age often includes legal defense. Andrew Weiner & Joseph Saka, The Basics of 




 57. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical 
Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 965 (1963). 
 58. That physicians often honor this ethic in the breach, through increased 
use of services in which they have a financial interest, doesn’t undermine Ar-
row’s argument: less-than-complete adherence still provides a measure of reas-
surance. The import of trustworthiness in different economic endeavors argua-
bly varies along a continuum, based on the magnitude of information 
asymmetries. 
 59. M. Gregg Bloche, The Market for Medical Ethics, 26 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 1099, 1108 (2001); cf. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND 
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3. Research Ethics and Statistical v. Therapeutic Significance 
The ethics of clinical research further reinforce the premise 
that only therapeutic risk and benefit matter. By longstanding 
precept, enshrined in federal human-subjects research regula-
tions, clinical trials of tests and treatments can only be con-
ducted when the alternatives to be studied are in “equipoise”—
that is, when there is “genuine uncertainty” on the investigator’s 
part concerning these alternatives’ comparative effectiveness.60 
Cost is beside the point—a treatment that a researcher has rea-
son to believe is slightly more effective than another cannot be 
compared to the other in a trial employing human subjects, even 
if the treatment believed to be better is much more expensive. 
This ethical precept has the force of law. Federal regulations 
impose it for research conducted with federal funds.61 Institu-
tional Review Boards generally mandate it even for privately-
funded clinical trials. And when harm comes to a human subject 
enrolled in such a study, these regulations are likely to be 
treated as the standard of care for tort liability purposes.62 Hu-
man-subjects research ethics thus further entrench the principle 
that doctors and hospitals have a duty to provide the most effec-
tive care, regardless of cost. 
So does the standard clinical-research practice of elevating 
statistical over therapeutic significance. Researchers routinely 
design and evaluate clinical studies with a focus on the former 
at the expense of the latter. They choose outcome variables63 and 
 
PATIENT 100–03 (1986) (discussing patients’ psychological regression and re-
sulting need to see their physicians as all-powerful in the way that young chil-
dren view their parents). 
 60. Benjamin Freedman, Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical Research, 317 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 141 (1987). 
 61. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2012) (making no provision for cost reduction as a 
potential “benefit” meriting comparison of more versus less effective therapies). 
 62. Roger L. Jansson, Researcher Liability for Negligence in Human Subject 
Research: Informed Consent and Researcher Malpractice Actions, 78 WASH. L. 
REV. 229 (2003). 
 63. Designers of both prospective clinical trials and observational studies 
can choose from among a variety of metrics of effectiveness (known as study 
endpoints). Common metrics include rate of survival for a set time (often five 
years), progression-free survival (how long a patient lives with the disease with-
out it getting worse), and time to progression (how long from diagnosis (or com-
mencement of treatment) until the disease starts to get worse). NCI Dictionary 
of Cancer Terms, NAT’L CANCER INST., https://www.cancer.gov/publications/ 
dictionaries/cancer-terms?cdrid=44782 [https://perma.cc/DZ24-TRQ4]. 
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courses of control versus experimental treatment with the aim 
of ensuring that the chance of a result’s being real, not random, 
is tiny—typically less than 5%.64 And so long as they achieve 
proof that one therapeutic approach yields a better outcome than 
another with a less than 5% likelihood that this difference is a 
matter of chance, they treat the superiority of this approach as 
established—even if its therapeutic advantage is very small. 
Physicians then make it standard practice,65 and insurers come 
under pressure to cover it,66 even when tiny advantage comes at 
great expense. 
4. The Steep Price of Rescue 
The current surge in cancer treatments with sticker-shock 
prices illustrates this dynamic. A new generation of medications 
targets tumor blood flow, cellular metabolism, and immune re-
sponses to malignancy—and is pushing up prescription drug 
spending.67 Consider the case of colorectal cancer, the third-lead-
ing killer among malignancies (behind only breast and lung can-
cers). 
Colorectal cancer afflicts 1.3 million Americans at any given 
time, with 140,000 new diagnoses and 50,000 deaths each year.68 
Metastatic colorectal cancer (mCRC, also known as Stage IV) 
 
 64. Statistical significance refers to the probability that an experimental 
result (e.g., one treatment’s superiority to another on a metric of performance) 
is not due to chance. Clinical researchers have long employed the “p-value” to 
measure this probability; as a matter of convention, researchers typically treat 
a result as “statistically significant” if its associated p-value is less than 0.05 
(p<.05)—that is, if there is a less than 5% chance that the outcome was random. 
 65. See supra text accompanying notes 55–59 (discussing the medical pro-
fession’s understanding that it is obligated to offer all treatments with net ther-
apeutic benefit); see also infra text accompanying notes 106–17 (discussing legal 
pressures on physicians to offer such treatments). 
 66. See supra text accompanying notes 47–54 (discussing cultural, social, 
and thus market pressures on insurers to cover treatments with net therapeutic 
benefit); see also infra text accompanying notes 117–23 (discussing legal pres-
sures to do so). 
 67. IMS Health, which tracks physician prescribing patterns, estimates 
that Americans paid nearly $310 billion for prescription drugs in 2015, up 8.5% 
from 2014. Medicines Use and Spending in the U.S., IMS INST. FOR 
HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (2016), https://morningconsult.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/04/IMS-Institute-US-Drug-Spending-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
H2M8-VPG7]. Of this, $39.1 billion (12.6%) went to oncology drugs.  
 68. Cancer Stat Facts: Colorectal Cancer, NAT’L CANCER INST., https://seer 
.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/colorect.html [https://perma.cc/A5BW-Y29X]. 
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has an abysmal prognosis: only 11% of patients survive for five 
years.69 A drug that could cure mCRC, or greatly delay its pro-
gression, would be a breakthrough of historic humanitarian sig-
nificance. So, there should surely be strong incentives for phar-
maceutical firms to develop new treatments. And indeed, there 
are many mCRC drugs on the market that cost exorbitant sums. 
But these drugs deliver minimal therapeutic benefit. 
To see this, consider Figure 1, which compares additional 
annual spending (above that for previously-standard therapy)70 
to additional therapeutic benefit (measured in months of sur-
vival71) for all FDA-approved, new-generation72 drugs for 
mCRC.73 Because pharmaceuticals are typically cheap to pro-
duce once manufacturing plants are up and running—in eco-
nomic terms, their marginal cost is low—their sale prices are 
good indicators of the rewards they generate for drug makers.74 
And additional survival time is a good, if imperfect metric of 
therapeutic benefit. 
 
 69. This compares to a 92% five-year survival rate for Stage I colorectal 
tumors (which have neither spread to other organs nor grown beyond the inner 
layers of the colon or rectum). See Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results 
Program, Cancer Stat Facts: Colon and Rectum Cancer, NAT’L CANCER INST., 
https://seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/colorect.html [https://perma.cc/ZZ6T 
-WYTH]; What Are the Survival Rates for Colorectal Cancer, by Stage?, AM. CAN-
CER SOC’Y, https://www.cancer.org/cancer/colon-rectal-cancer/detection 
-diagnosis-staging/survival-rates.html [https://perma.cc/ZZ6T-WYTH]. 
 70. We obtained this spending data from GoodRX.com, an online prescrip-
tion retailer. GOODRX, https://www.goodrx.com/. We used it to estimate the an-
nual cost of treatment for each drug. 
 71. The survival numbers reported in Figure 1 are averages for all reported 
clinical trials for each drug. Some of the drugs were tested in multiple clinical 
trials; for example, panitumumab (Vectibix®) was tested in three trials and 
bevacizumab (Avastin®) was tested twice. 
 72. By “new generation,” we mean medications that target particular 
genes, proteins, or metabolic pathways, as opposed to traditional, much cheaper 
chemotherapies that kill cells indiscriminately, in rough proportion to their 
rates of growth. 
 73. We collected this survival data from completed Phase 3 interventional 
clinical trials with statistically significant results. In each of these trials, the 
control was a traditional, oft-used, indiscriminate chemotherapy. See supra note 
72. The data in Figure 1 was gathered in August–September 2016 from clinical 
trials reported at https://www.clinicaltrials.gov/. While drug companies are re-
quired to report the results of all clinical trials at clinicaltrials.gov, compliance 
with this directive is sometimes spotty; accordingly, we might have missed other 
relevant trials. 
 74. We would need to factor in sales volumes, of course, to estimate the 
overall revenue each of these drugs yields for its manufacturer. 
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Were economic reward tied to therapeutic benefit, we would 
expect annualized drug cost (on the y axis in Figure 1) to rise 
with increasing contribution to survival. A line through the six 
plotted points would slope upwards. But we don’t see this; to the 
contrary, there is no evident relationship between therapeutic 
benefit and economic reward. Since drug firms set prices based 
on perceived market conditions, this underscores the weakness 
or absence of market signals favoring greater therapeutic bene-
fit.75 
More stunning is the sticker-shock pricing for paltry sur-
vival gains that all six plotted points represent. The biggest 
shocker among the six, regorafenib (Stivarga®) delivers about 1.5 
months additional life expectancy, on average, for an annualized 
 
 75. Six plotted points, of course, don’t constitute proof, but the absence of a 
relationship between these six drugs’ pricing and therapeutic benefit is con-
sistent with the dynamic we’ve described. 
Figure 1: Average Annualized Drug Costs Versus Average Marginal In-
crease in Overall Survival for Metastatic Colorectal Cancer Treatments  
Sources: https://www.clinicaltrials.gov and GoodRX.com 
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cost of almost $250,000. Averaging annualized outlays and im-
provements in life expectancy for all six drugs yields a price tag 
of $56,000 per year for each additional month of survival, or 
more than $670,000 per year for each year of life gained. These 
numbers understate matters: many mCRC patients can be ex-
pected to take one or more of these drugs for a few or more 
years.76 Data on duration of treatment for each of these drugs is 
not readily available,77 but by way of illustration, a patient who 
for twenty-seven months paid78 the above-noted average annual 
price of $56,000 for an additional month of life would incur a cost 
of more than $1.5 million per life-year gained.79 
The weight of this burden—its opportunity cost for society—
is made plain by studies of how people’s health and safety choices 
in non-medical realms translate into dollar values for years of 
life.80 Controversy surrounds these studies’ estimates of dollar 
value—controversy that grows fierce when policymakers rely on 
them (and explosive when these estimates discount life’s value 
based on diminished quality).81 But the values commonly urged 
for a year of life illuminate the opportunities forgone by spending 
on these mCRC drugs. Dollar values for a so-called “quality-ad-
justed life year (QALY),”82 calculated by researchers in recent 
 
 76. In one study, the mean time from mCRC diagnosis to death was almost 
three years. Kevin Knopf et al., Survival Outcomes in U.S. Patients with Meta-
static Colorectal Cancer: A Retrospective Database Analysis (mCRC), J. CLIN. 
ONCOLOGY 31, supp. 4 (2013). 
 77. Ongoing, rapid changes in clinical practice may make it impossible to 
answer this question. 
 78. Most patients, of course, don’t pay out of pocket (all but the wealthiest 
among us can’t afford these prices); we pay, collectively, through insurance pre-
miums, taxes, and cross-subsidization by health care providers. 
 79. $56,000 (annual price for an additional month of life) * 27 months = 
$1.512 million. 
 80. See generally Milton C. Weinstein et al., QALYs: The Basics, VALUE IN 
HEALTH, 12, S5–S9 (2009). Risk-related wage differentials and consumers’ will-
ingness to pay for safer products are among the metrics employed to attach dol-
lar values to years of life. 
 81. See generally Peter J. Neumann, What’s Next for QALY’s?, 305 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 1806 (2011); John Rawls, Castigating QALYs, 15 J. MED. ETHICS 
143 (1989) (outlining criticisms of QALYs). 
 82. Calculation of QALYs discounts years of life gained, or saved, by a fac-
tor that supposedly expresses the diminished value of lives lived in states of 
impaired health. Weinstein et al., supra note 80. 
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years, range from $50,000 to $200,00083—about $4,200 to 
$16,700 per month.  
The above-estimated costs for a year (or a month) of life 
gained from new-generation mCRC therapies dwarf these QALY 
values. One can quibble with our cost estimates but not with the 
reality that these costs far exceed calculated QALY values: our 
average annualized cost of $56,000 for a month of life84 is more 
than three and one-third times greater than the maximum com-
monly-proposed value for a QALY.85 
Disproportionate costs for minimal, even nonexistent thera-
peutic benefits are endemic in cancer therapy more generally.86 
And oncology’s upward pressure on medical spending is expected 
to intensify as high-priced oncology drugs occupy a growing 
share of the pharmaceutical market.87 
Many of these drugs reflect genuine scientific advances, 
however marginal their clinical benefits. But most of the pre-
scription medications approved by the FDA in recent decades are 
 
 83. See Peter J. Neumann et al., Updating Cost-Effectiveness—The Curious 
Resilience of the $50,000-per-QALY Threshold, 371 N. ENG. J. MED. 796, 796–
97 (2014). 
 84. Supra text accompanying note 79. 
 85. Id. Moreover, since metastatic colorectal cancer is a grave illness, pro-
ponents of the QALY approach would discount these drugs’ longevity gains, 
boosting the drugs’ cost-per-QALY above their cost per actual life-year gained. 
 86. Consider Genentech’s drug Avastin® (bevacizumab). Touted as a major 
breakthrough in treating metastatic non-squamous non-small cell lung cancer, 
this drug extends the life expectancy of late-stage lung cancer patients by just 
two months—from 10.3 to 12.3 months. Eric Budish et al., Do Firms Underin-
vest in Long-Term Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. 
ECON. REV. 2044, 2045 (2015). Another recent study estimated that for the sev-
enty-one drugs approved by the FDA for solid tumors between 2002 and 2014, 
median gains in progression-free and overall survival were a mere 2.5 and 2.1 
months, respectively. Tito Fojo et al., Unintended Consequences of Expensive 
Cancer Therapeutics—The Pursuit of Marginal Indications and a Me-Too Men-
tality That Stifles Innovation and Creativity, 140 J. AM. MED. ASS’N OTOLARYN-
GOLOGY—HEAD & NECK SURGERY 1225, 1227 (2014) (concluding that only 
thirty (42%) of the seventy-one drugs achieved “clinically meaningful improve-
ments”). 
 87. IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, GLOBAL MEDICINES USE IN 
2020: OUTLOOK AND IMPLICATIONS (2015), https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/ 
iqvia/pdfs/institute-reports/global-medicines-use-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/ 
JXK4-9N5M] (predicting that one-third of all new drugs introduced by 2020 will 
treat cancer). 
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so-called “me-too” drugs,88 belonging to the same chemical cate-
gory and sharing the same molecular mechanism as previously-
introduced medications.89 These drugs deliver no additional 
therapeutic value.90 The resources devoted to developing and 
marketing them are almost entirely wasted.91 Pharmaceutical 
firms’ success in selling patent-protected “me-too” medications 
for prices much higher than those for generic originals in the 
same categories demonstrates the power of even dubious claims 
of benefit—and the cost these claims impose. 
Much attention has been paid to a report from the Institute 
of Medicine (IOM) concluding that 30%, or $750 billion, of what 
the U.S. spent on health care in 2009 was wasted.92 (Adjusted 
for subsequent increases in medical spending, this figure would 
be more than $1 trillion.) Fraud, overpricing, and pointless ad-
ministrative expense captured headlines.93 But as much as half 
 
 88. See NDA Approvals by Therapeutic Potential and Chemical Type, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://web.archive.org/web/20090720060525/http:// 
www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedand 
Approved/DrugandBiologicApprovalReports/ucm121102.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
H29G-AXES] (last updated Dec. 31, 2004) (reporting that 58% of the 248 new 
molecular entities approved by the FDA between 1990 and 2004 were me-too 
drugs).  
 89. Stephane Régnier, What Is the Value of ‘Me-Too’ Drugs?, 16 HEALTH 
CARE MGMT. SCI. 300, 300 (2013). A more recent study from the Institute for 
Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (IQWiG)—a German health technology 
assessment agency charged with investigating the marginal benefit of new 
drugs over the standard of care—concluded that “[m]ore than half of new drugs 
in Germany lack proof of added benefit over existing treatments.” Beate 
Wieseler et al., New Drugs: Where Did We Go Wrong and What Can We Do Bet-
ter?, BRITISH MED. J., July 10, 2019, at 1, 4. 
 90. Régnier, supra note 89. To be sure, a patient may be allergic to one but 
not another drug in the same chemical class; moreover, differences in drug ab-
sorption or metabolism may matter clinically, making “me-too” molecules occa-
sionally useful. 
 91. Not only do additional drugs in a class often add minimal therapeutic 
value; the claim that they yield economic value through price competition is 
arguably mythic as well. See, e.g., Nicole M. Gastala et al., Medicare Part D: 
Patients Bear the Cost of “Me Too” Brand-Name Drugs, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1237, 
1237 (2016) (noting that therapeutically equivalent “me-too” medications are 
often prescribed and cost significantly more than cheaper generic medications). 
 92. INST. OF MED., BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO CONTINU-
OUSLY LEARNING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 101–02 (Mark Smith et al. eds., 
2013). 
 93. E.g., Alex Wayne, Health System in U.S. Plagued by $765 Billion in 
Waste, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 6, 2012, 10:02 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
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of this waste,94 according to the IOM, is care that yields no ther-
apeutic benefit.95 Some of this care is clearly useless—e.g. redun-
dant tests, or interventions that defy scientific proof of their 
pointlessness. But much is futile only after the fact: it’s plausible 
in advance for the doctors who order it to suspect that it might 
produce some benefit. Its enormous expense is the price of our 
national unwillingness to forgo even tiny chances of therapeutic 
advantage, especially when threats to health loom imminently. 
We don’t mean, in this Article, to condemn this national 
trait. To the contrary, we have argued that uncompromising use 
of available rescue technologies is inevitable, even at times no-
ble96—and embedded in our psychology, culture, and ethics, as 
well as stakeholders’ settled expectations. Rather, we mean to 
highlight the steep price, in opportunities forgone, that we pay 
for our clinical aggressiveness. Dollar values calculated for 
QALYs reflect the tradeoffs people make beyond the medical 
realm, between health and other wants and needs. Medical ex-
penditures that “buy” health outcomes at prices higher than 
what people are wont to pay for equivalent health outcomes out-
side the hospital or doctor’s suite97 crowd out alternative, higher-
value uses of the money spent. 
Such medical expenditures are consonant with the psychol-
ogy of rescue—in this sense, they deliver value that the QALY 
metric fails to capture—but they bleed society of value that peo-
ple would otherwise prefer. If there’s a way to fulfill our longing 
for medical rescuers’ best efforts at reduced cost to our other 




 94. This portion totals more than half if one includes the overpricing and 
administrative spending associated with it. See INST. OF MED., supra note 92, 
at 102. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Supra text accompanying notes 48–50. 
 97. We can also calculate a treatment’s incremental cost-effectiveness ratio 
(ICER), which is the ratio of incremental costs to incremental benefits:  
𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑅 =  
𝐶1−𝐶0
𝐸1−𝐸0
, with the effectiveness parameter usually measured in QALYs. For 
example, a therapy that costs $50,000 more than the best alternative and that 
extends life by two more months (with full health) than does this alternative 
would have an ICER of $50,000/(2/12) = $300,000/year—much greater than 
even the highest empirically-based estimates of the value of a QALY. 
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5. A Doctors’ Plot? 
Some have argued that physicians impose the ethic of un-
compromising loyalty to patients in collusive, self-serving fash-
ion, and that many consumers would, if given the chance, choose 
to pay less for health plans that require doctors to forgo pricey, 
maximally-beneficial care to save money.98 This begs the ques-
tion of why insurers haven’t offered such plans. Surely, if they 
saw a market for such low-end coverage, they would have 
pressed to do so. Prior to the ACA’s passage, nationwide mini-
mum-benefit requirements99 didn’t stand in the way. And surely, 
the several large health plans with national reach and tens of 
millions of subscribers could marshal their enormous purchasing 
power to negotiate concessions from physicians willing to trade 
fealty to the clinical state-of-the-art for access to large pools of 
patients.100 
That insurers haven’t done so—that they’ve never explicitly 
challenged the Hippocratic ideal (however much they’ve pushed 
back against it covertly101) is, we think, the product not of illicit 
economic collusion but of the mutually reinforcing influence of 
patients’ psychological needs, society’s deep-rooted expectations, 
and the profession’s long-standing values. It is also, we will ar-
gue presently, a product of law. 
B. LAW AND THE NEGLECT OF COST 
Law, as well, reflects and reinforces the ethic of rescue, the 
Hippocratic ideal, and neglect of cost. Multiple common-law and 
statutory regimes push in the same direction, away from the bal-
 
 98. E.g., CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CON-
TRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 228–29 (1995); Mark A. Hall, Ra-
tioning Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 699–700 (1994). 
 99. Larry Levitt et al., Questions About Essential Health Benefits, KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 18, 2011), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/perspective/ 
questions-about-essential-health-benefits/ [https://perma.cc/E4SR-WF6Q]. 
 100. See Erin E. Trish & Bradley J. Herring, How Do Health Insurer Market 
Concentration and Bargaining Power with Hospitals Affect Health Insurance 
Premiums?, 42 J. HEALTH ECON. 104, 113 (2015) (describing how insurers could 
use leverage with providers to lower insurance premiums). 
 101. See generally M. Gregg Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Mar-
ketplace, 55 STAN. L. REV. 919 (2002) (discussing insurers’ use of financial in-
centives to nudge physicians away from the Hippocratic ethic of undivided com-
mitment to their patients’ well-being). 
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ancing of therapeutic benefit against economic burden and to-
ward all-out deployment of existing clinical resources. Medical 
tort law and the ACA’s “independent review” scheme102 for reso-
lution of disputes over insurance coverage exert great force in 
this regard. They’re backed up by the ACA’s explicit prohibition 
of both “rationing”103 and the use of “quality-adjusted life 
years”104 (QALYs) in the development of federal health-care pay-
ment policy—and by Medicare’s statutory separation of coverage 
determinations and payment rates for clinical services.105 
1. Medical Tort Law 
The law of negligence calls upon actors to take care so long 
as the expected benefits of doing so outweigh the costs of not do-
ing so.106 In pursuit of this idea, negligence law often looks to 
industry standards for rules of conduct;107 the rationale for this 
is that industry practice in well-functioning markets reflects the 
optimal balance of benefit and cost108—“reasonable care.”109 As 
every first-year law student learns, negligence doctrine calls for 
courts to disregard industry standards when markets don’t re-
flect this optimal balance—when, in Learned Hand’s iconic lan-
guage, “a whole calling may have unduly lagged . . . .”110 Judges 
have done so in many specialized fields,111 typically imposing 
 
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19 (2012). 
 103. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-37(a)(2)(B) (2012) (stating that the findings of the Pa-
tient Centered Outcomes Research Institute shall “not be construed as man-
dates, guidelines, or recommendations for payment, coverage, or treatment”). 
 104. 42 U.S.C. 1320e-1(e) (2012). 
 105. Compare 42 U.S.C. 1395y(l)(1) (2012) (granting the Secretary of Health 
& Human Services the authority to determine covered expenses that are “rea-
sonable and necessary”), with 42 U.S.C. 1395w-4(b) (2012) (directing the Secre-
tary to establish fee schedules based on the service’s “relative value,” “conver-
sion factor,” and “geographic adjustment factor”). 
 106. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 107. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 285, 291 (2008). 
 108. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability 
Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 725 (1996) (discussing 
damage calculations based on prevention costs and resulting harm). 
 109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1965). 
 110. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). 
 111. Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 107. 
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levels of care higher than industry norms.112 But for medicine, 
deference to professional standards has been the rule,113 despite 
the role of insurance in driving the intensity of care to levels not 
justifiable in cost-benefit balancing terms.114 
Tort law thus powerfully reinforces professional norms115—
and the aforementioned psychological, cultural, economic, and 
ethical influences that shape them—by putting physicians who 
breach them at risk for career-altering liability. Indeed, the tort 
system likely boosts clinical spending by a few to several per-
centage points, since some doctors appear to react to their fear 
of liability by ordering tests and treatments they wouldn’t other-
wise prescribe.116 
2. Coverage Disputes and Independent Review 
By 2010, when the ACA became law, all but seven states had 
enacted external review schemes to resolve disputes between pa-
tients and health insurers over whether care should be cov-
ered.117 The ACA made such review near-universal,118 imposing 
 
 112. See Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and 
History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 38 (1992) (“It is 
always open season on an established practice . . . .”). 
 113. This deference has evolved—the second half of the twentieth century 
saw courts in many jurisdictions move from local to national standards of care. 
Alex Stein, Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1210 
(2012). Some states permit multiple clinical standards (e.g., adopting the “re-
spectable minority” rule, which allows alternative standards so long as some 
respected practitioners adhere to them). Id. at 1212–13. 
 114. See supra text accompanying notes 38–40. 
 115. See Sara C. Charles et al., Physicians on Trial—Self-Reported Reactions 
to Malpractice Trials, 148 W. J. MED. 358, 359 (1988) (illustrating physician 
behavior changes after being sued). 
 116. Michelle M. Mello et al., National Costs of the Medical Liability System, 
29 HEALTH AFF. 1569, 1572–73 (2010). This effect on medical spending is more 
modest than that claimed by advocates of damage caps and other limits on mal-
practice liability; indeed, some of these advocates inaccurately insist that mal-
practice liability is a main driver of rising clinical spending. E.g., Sebastian 
Panthöfer, Do Doctors Prescribe Antibiotics Out of Fear of Malpractice? 6 (Univ. 
of York Health, Econometric & Data Grp., Working Paper No. 16/31, 2016), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309592434_Do_Doctors_Prescribe_ 
Antibiotics_Out_of_Fear_of_Malpractice [https://perma.cc/3KQZ-BZKZ]. 
 117. Wade S. Hauser, Does Iowa’s Health Care External Review Process Re-
place Common-Law Rights?, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1401, 1405–06 (2014). 
 118. Only so-called “grandfathered health plans,” plans purchased on the in-
dividual market before March 23, 2010, are exempt from the ACA’s external 
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nationwide requirements that, in practice, lock in professional 
standards of care as benchmarks for what insurers should 
cover.119 Health plans depart from these professional practice 
norms at their peril. To be sure, health plans frequently take this 
risk: external reviewers’ reversals of coverage denials approach, 
or even exceed, 50%120 in some states.121 Plans have powerful in-
centives to take this gamble. They needn’t pay compensatory 
damages or any other penalty when they lose: they are responsi-
ble only for covering the services for which they’d earlier refused 
to pay.122 And coverage denials that patients don’t challenge are 
financial “wins” for health plans even when the forgone chal-
lenges would succeed.123 But plans achieve these financial gains 
 
review requirements. U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Grandfa-
thered Health Plan, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/ 
grandfathered-health-plan/ [https://perma.cc/6A3N-QFVC]; Guidance on Exter-
nal Review for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Offering 
Group and Individual Health Coverage, and Guidance for States on State Ex-
ternal Review Processes, U.S. DEP’T LABOR: EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN. (June 
22, 2011), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/employers-and-advisers/ 
guidance/technical-releases/11-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VXB-9C3D]. 
 119. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19 (2012). It achieves this by adopting the “consumer 
protections” set forth in a model state statute, the Uniform Health Carrier Ex-
ternal Review Model Act, developed by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC). UNIFORM HEALTH CARRIER EXTERNAL REVIEW MODEL 
ACT (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS), https://www.naic.org/documents/ 
committees_b_uniform_health_carrier_ext_rev_model_act.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/HXR7-CHBQ] (instructing reviewers to give weight to treating physicians’ 
recommendations, clinical practice guidelines promulgated by specialty socie-
ties, and other professional authorities). 
 120. See, e.g., Pauline Bartolone, Patients Win About Half the Time They 
Challenge Denied Health Care Services, CAP. PUB. RADIO (Apr. 1, 2014), http:// 
www.capradio.org/articles/2014/04/01/patients-win-about-half-the-time-they 
-challenge-denied-health-care-services/ [https://perma.cc/36GB-UZUC] (report-
ing external-appeal success rates of fifty-one to fifty-seven percent for California 
patients who challenged coverage denials by four large health plans between 
2006 and 2012). 
 121. Karen Pollitz et al., Claims Denials and Appeals in ACA Marketplace 
Plans, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/ 
issue-brief/claims-denials-and-appeals-in-aca-marketplace-plans/ [https:// 
perma.cc/3HFM-ZRNX]. 
 122. Appealing Health Plan Decisions, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
https://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/about-the-law/cancellations-and-appeals/ 
appealing-health-plan-decisions/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z6TU-63CV]. 
 123. More Consumers Could Benefit from Independent External Review, 
NAT’L ASS’N OF INDEP. REV. ORG. (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.nairo.org/2017 
-08-24-more-consumers-could-benefit-from-independent-external-review/.  
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on the down-low. These “wins” send no signal to health care pro-
viders to economize on care, aside from the prospect of needing 
to do paperwork to file an external appeal. The main message 
from the ACA’s external-review requirement, a requirement that 
applies to almost all employment-based and individually-pur-
chased coverage (and thus to the vast majority of privately-in-
sured Americans), is that professional standards of care gov-
ern—standards shaped by the ethic of rescue, the Hippocratic 
ideal, and disregard for cost. 
3. FDA Criteria for New Drugs and Medical Devices 
By statute, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is ob-
ligated to allow sale and use of new prescription drugs and med-
ical devices upon a showing that they are safe and effective.124 
Neither the FDA’s enabling legislation nor its mechanisms for 
judging safety and effectiveness permit the agency to consider 
therapeutic value relative to cost.125 As a result, even a tiny ther-
apeutic benefit that a new drug or device achieves for a small 
subpopulation of those upon whom the product is tested suffices 
to show that it is “safe and effective,” so long as an FDA-ap-
proved clinical trial establishes that the benefit is statistically 
significant.126 A manufacturer need not even show that its new 
product is superior to the status quo; so-called “me-too” drugs 
and devices routinely enter the market in this manner.127 
Once the FDA approves a new drug or device, the manufac-
turer can promote even the smallest of marginal advantages to 
patients128 and physicians. Sometimes, patients ask for the new 
 
 124. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012). 
 125. See, e.g., id. (describing grounds for refusal of new drug applications, 
with safety and effectiveness as the primary standards; no mention of cost anal-
ysis is included). 
 126. Statistical significance is defined, by convention, as a less than 5% prob-
ability that a finding is the product of chance. Supra text accompanying note 
64. Drug and device makers have finely honed the craft of spotting subpopula-
tions that show some benefit even when the overall set of patients enrolled in a 
controlled trial does not. 
 127. NDA Approvals by Therapeutic Potential and Chemical Type, supra 
note 88. 
 128. Promotion of prescription drugs and devices directly to patients has had 
growing influence on sales over the past twenty years, owing to the FDA’s re-
laxation of regulatory constraints on so-called “direct-to-consumer” (DTC) ad-
vertising. David Lazarus, Ask Laz: Direct-to-Consumer Drug Ads: A Bad Idea 
That’s About to Get Worse, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017, 9:25 AM), https://www 
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product and physicians then prescribe it;129 other times, physi-
cians spur the product’s adoption in response to companies’ pro-
motional efforts.130 Moreover, while federal law criminalizes 
manufacturers’ promotion of drugs and devices for uses that the 
FDA hasn’t authorized,131 physicians (including those who re-
ceive financial benefits from drug or device makers) are permit-
ted to promote unapproved uses, even absent evidence of thera-
peutic benefit. The upshot is that the law governing FDA 
approval of new drugs and devices locks open multiple pathways 
to adoption of technologies that yield statistically significant but 
therapeutically small (and, for unapproved uses, sometimes non-
existent) benefits, often at great cost.132 
4. Patent Law and Drug Companies’ Reach for Mediocrity 
Our current patent system largely magnifies rather than 
mitigates the distortion we identify here. This shouldn’t be the 
case—after all, the whole purpose of patent law is to incentivize 
new and useful inventions.133 In theory, patent law does this by 




 129. Both market pressure (to satisfy patients) and Hippocratic obligation to 
provide all beneficial care push physicians to do so. Robert J. Marder, The Opi-
oid Epidemic: Patient Satisfaction and Physician Prescribing, HEALTHLEADERS 
(Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/strategy/opioid-epidemic 
-patient-satisfaction-and-physician-prescribing [https://perma.cc/7AKR-5PYH] 
(describing the growing market pressure on physicians to achieve high patient-
satisfaction ratings, which can yield more referrals and bigger fees); infra text 
accompanying notes 165–74. 
 130. JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND 
COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2004). 
 131. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for in-
troduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an 
application filed pursuant to subsection (b) or (j) of this section is effective with 
respect to such drug.”). 
 132. Note that this cost isn’t only the expense of manufacturing the drug or 
device (plus the profits accruing to firms’ owners); it includes the opportunity 
cost, for society, of firms’ failure to devote their R&D resources to projects with 
greater therapeutic potential. 
 133. See Alan Devlin & Neel U. Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the 
Utilitarian Foundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897, 914 (2009) 
(describing the utilitarianism behind patent law to promote socially-beneficial 
inventions). 
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on inventions that would otherwise not be profitable.134 And 
basic economic theory suggests that inventions that generate 
private returns should generally also create social value, since 
people would otherwise not purchase the product sold by the pa-
tentee.135 
While this assumption might be reasonable in a typical mar-
ket, this logic is often turned on its head in the realm of medical 
innovation. The problem here is that private value is often not 
aligned with social value; this in turn means patent law might 
not promote socially optimal outcomes in this setting. 
This problem manifests itself most directly in the projects 
that putative inventors choose to pursue. Specifically, current 
patent law might distort firm incentives, causing them to pursue 
projects that have lower social value but higher private re-
turns.136 And by pursuing an invention that maximizes her pri-
vate returns, the inventor might crowd out investment in other 
projects that would generate a larger social return.137 Put differ-
ently, while patent law might make many different inventions 
profitable, it might not tilt inventors’ preferences toward the 
most socially valuable ones. 
The following numerical example helps illustrate the point. 
Suppose a company is deciding whether to invest in one of two 
projects: a “low-value” project that delivers $1 million in social 
value with a 90% chance of success, and a “high-value” project 
 
 134. Patents create private value by solving a well-known public goods prob-
lem. It often costs substantial time, money, and effort to create a new invention 
and turn it into a commercially viable product. Patents are a limited, legal mo-
nopoly we award to inventors that enables them to recover these costs. Without 
patents, we worry about free-riding, where a competitor copies an innovation 
once it’s sold or otherwise publicly available and incorporates it into a competing 
product, thereby eating into the innovator’s profits. A patent heightens an in-
novator’s private return on her creation, allowing her to recoup more of her R&D 
investment and thereby encouraging her to create the invention in the first 
place. 
 135. See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 318 
(1995) (stating that in a competitive equilibrium, price will not exceed a con-
sumer’s marginal utility). 
 136. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 3, 7 (2013) (arguing that patent systems discourage innovation 
because of the legal actions confronting potential inventors). See generally Heidi 
L. Williams, How Do Patents Affect Research Investments?, 9 ANN. REV. ECON. 
441, 445 (2017) (surveying empirical studies on the effect of patent law on public 
and private research investments). 
 137. See Devlin & Sukhatme, supra note 133. 
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that delivers $8 million in social value with a 50% chance of suc-
cess. Both projects deliver nothing if they fail, and assume (for 
simplicity), the company keeps the entire social value of what-
ever project it chooses. Which project will the firm select? 
The firm’s expected returns from the two projects are: 
$1 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 0.90 =  $900,000, for the low-value project, and  
$8 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 0.50 =  $4,000,000, for the high-value project.  
A risk-neutral firm would select the high-value, socially op-
timal project, as it delivers more private value. 
Now instead assume the firm receives $9 million in private 
value for any new technology that improves upon the status quo, 
even if it creates almost no additional social value. Then the 
firm’s expected returns become:  
. 90 ∗ ($1 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  $9 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛)  =  $9 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛, for the low-
value project, but only: 
. 50 ∗ ($8 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  $9 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛)  =  $8.5 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛, for the high-
value project. 
Here, the firm will choose the low-value project, even though 
it generates less social value. Note this is true even though the 
firm would earn more ($17 million) if it chose the high-value pro-
ject and was successful. 
What motivates the change in the firm’s project choice to-
ward the low-value (socially suboptimal) project? The driving 
force is the $9 million in private returns that the firm receives 
for improving upon the status quo, however barely. Namely, the 
firm is skewed toward the low-value invention because that pro-
ject is less risky and the firm’s guaranteed payment for exceed-
ing the status quo is high enough that it does not want to bear 
the additional risk inherent in pursuing the high-value inven-
tion. 
Indeed, the reality is worse than this: the private return for 
drug developers often bears minimal relation to the therapeutic 
value of a clinical intervention, so the developer captures less of 
the social value as it increases.138 This results in a “flatter” slope 
when graphing private value versus social value, similar to that 
apparent from the mCRC treatments graphed in Figure 1. So in 
 
 138. See Laura Entis, Why Does Medicine Cost So Much? Here’s How Drug 
Prices Are Set, TIME (Apr. 9, 2019), https://time.com/5564547/drug-prices 
-medicine/?amp=true [https://perma.cc/8N5H-NY44] (describing drug price ti-
ers, which are primarily based on manufacturers’ willingness to offer discounts 
to pharmacy benefit managers rather than on the drugs’ effectiveness). 
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our example, if the firm recovers 100% of the social value for the 
low-value invention but only 50% of the social value for the high-
value invention, then the private boost would only need to exceed 
$2.75 million in order to induce the firm to pick the socially 
suboptimal, low-value project.139 
In the pharmaceutical context, these less risky, low-value 
inventions typically correspond to me-too drugs. From a scien-
tific perspective, me-too drugs are often less risky to pursue be-
cause their chemical structure and mechanism of action is simi-
lar to existing drugs. From an expected demand perspective, me-
too drugs are also less risky because consumers have already re-
vealed whether there is demand for a similar drug on the mar-
ket, so putative manufacturers have more information about 
their likely profits. 
So it’s no wonder why drug companies continue to seek out 
me-too innovation. There is less reason for them to reach for 
higher-value, but riskier, research projects that potentially pro-
vide greater social benefit.140 Rather, firms plow money into pro-
jects that yield low social value but are less risky and provide 
high private returns.141 
Moreover, even if me-too drugs and other marginal innova-
tion offer some benefits, we need to ask whether those benefits 
 
 139. We get $2.75 million by solving for X in the following equation: (($8 
million*0.50) + $X million)*0.50 = ($1 million + $X million)*0.90. 
 140. In related work, one of the co-authors formally models how current mar-
ket dynamics incentivize firms to pursue marginal innovation over break-
through technologies. See Son Le & Neel U. Sukhatme, Reaching for Mediocrity: 
Competition and Stagnation in Pharmaceutical Innovation (July 12, 2019) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 141. David Abrams and others have investigated the relationship between a 
patent’s private and social value by examining whether a patent’s forward cita-
tions—the number of times it is cited by future patents—correlates with its pri-
vate value. Using data from non-practicing entities, they find that there is an 
inverted-U relationship between citations and value—value increases with ci-
tations for a while, and then decreases as forward citations become very fre-
quent. See David S. Abrams et al., Patent Value and Citations: Creative De-
struction or Strategic Disruption?, (Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository) 
(Nov. 5, 2013), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article 
=1497&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/39PW-VTRB]. 
Our discussion here does not contradict their results—private value and 
social value might be correlated for drugs and medical technology. But this cor-
relation is weak, and firm decision-making is skewed toward lower-value inno-
vations because firms receive a large fixed “boost” for any invention that exceeds 
the status quo. 
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justify the social costs they impose. Most importantly, these in-
clude opportunity costs—the drugs that pharmaceutical compa-
nies might have developed but chose not to because they devoted 
resources to developing a me-too drug instead. If the average cost 
of developing a new drug is $1 billion, as is commonly as-
serted,142 perhaps that money might have been better spent else-
where than on me-too products. If so, me-too innovation is crowd-
ing out other innovation that would be more socially valuable. 
5. The ACA’s Prohibitions Against “Rationing” and the Use of 
“Quality-Adjusted Life Years” 
As the political battle that preceded the ACA’s passage built 
to a crescendo, opponents tried to cast the law as a covert scheme 
to ration Medicare.143 Worried ACA drafters tried to deflect this 
attack by adding explicit prohibitions. An HHS panel conceived 
to develop cost-control strategy for Medicare in the event that 
the program broke through annual growth ceilings144 was as a 
result barred from issuing “any recommendation to ration 
healthcare.”145 The law’s authors also added language prohibit-
ing federally-funded clinical outcomes researchers146 and Medi-
care administrators from “develop[ing] or employ[ing] a dollars-
 
 142. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: 
New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 22 (2016). This proposi-
tion, which incorporates assumptions about opportunity costs and inflation and 
discount rates, is much disputed. Costs to Bring a Drug to Market Remain in 
Dispute, MANAGED CARE (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.managedcaremag.com/ 
news/20170914/costs-bring-drug-market-remain-dispute [https://perma.cc/ 
7QYE-N2H3]. 
 143. See Igor Volsky, Health Debate 2.0: Republicans Attack Obama for ‘Ra-
tioning’ Care with IPAB Commission, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 14, 2011, 5:20 PM), 
https://thinkprogress.org/health-debate-2-0-republicans-attack-obama-for 
-rationing-care-with-ipab-commission-1eb62c64041c/ [https://perma.cc/6G6S 
-NZ3G] (discussing the opposition’s critique of the ACA’s so-called “death 
panel”). 
 144. Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3403, 124 Stat. 119, 
489–507 (2010) (repealed 2018) (establishing the Independent Medicare Advi-
sory Board, which had authority to impose Medicare cost-containment prac-
tices, including changes in how healthcare providers are paid, subject to con-
gressional veto). In the event that Medicare’s projected per-capita growth 
exceeded growth ceilings, the HHS Secretary was required to impose the cost-
containment policies the Board proposed, unless Congress enacted an alterna-
tive approach. Id. at 489–94. 
 145. Id. at 490. 
 146. The ACA created a new federal agency, the Patient Centered Outcomes 
Research Institute (PCORI), to fund research into the comparative effectiveness 
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per-quality adjusted life year” or “similar measure” as a “thresh-
old” for determining “cost[-]effective[ness],” coverage, or pay-
ment.147 
“Rationing” has no clear legal definition beyond the term’s 
past use, most famously during World War II, to refer to regula-
tory mechanisms for distributing goods when demand exceeds 
supply.148 But in the health care context, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has used the term sweepingly, to characterize all with-
holding of clinical services that might provide any net therapeu-
tic benefit, whether the withholding occurs via regulatory, mar-
ket, or other means.149 Read this way, the ACA’s prohibition 
against Medicare rationing bars all cost-containment policies 
that forgo potential therapeutic benefit, a proscription in keep-
ing with the public expectations and professional ideals we’ve 
discussed. 
Even so, the Medicare cost-control panel, the Independent 
Payment Advisory Board (IPAB), was repeatedly condemned as 
a “rationing board.”150 Bipartisan opposition led to its repeal in 
2018.151 Rather than being a breakthrough in the fifty-year 
quest to contain Medicare spending, the IPAB was an object les-
son in the political hazards of even seeming to say “no” to care 
that might yield some net benefit. 
The proscription against Medicare’s use of quality and years 
of life to value medical services poses yet another barrier to the 
weighing of benefit against cost. This prohibition makes health 
care literally priceless as a matter of Medicare law: it commands 
 
of alternative clinical interventions. Some ACA opponents charged that 
PCORI’s hidden agenda was healthcare rationing, based on judgments about 
quality of life. Julie Appleby, New Group to Set Priorities for Medical Effective-
ness Research, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 16, 2012), https://khn.org/news/ 
comparative-effectiveness-health-care-pcori/ [https://perma.cc/8DYB-98H5]. 
 147. ACA, § 6301. 
 148. World War II Rationing, U.S. HISTORY, https://www.u-s-history.com/ 
pages/h1674.html [https://perma.cc/D97B-E5BT]. 
 149. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 220 (2000). 
 150. Jennifer Haberkorn & Ginger Gibson, Ryan Targets “Rationing Board,” 
POLITICO (Aug. 21, 2012, 10:41 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2012/08/ 
ryan-puts-rationing-board-in-the-crosshairs-079934?paginate=false [https:// 
perma.cc/WMZ7-22R5]. 
 151. Margot Sanger-Katz, Another of Obamacare’s Unloved Provisions Is 
Gone, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/upshot/ 
obamacare-ipab-medicare-congress.html [https://perma.cc/ZC8V-PU9E]. 
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that care yielding any potential benefit be covered and paid for 
without regard for the magnitude of this benefit. 
The ACA’s proscription against developing cost-effective-
ness measures that take life-expectancy and quality-of-life gains 
into account has even broader reach—to all Americans with pri-
vate insurance, as well as to those covered through Medicare and 
Medicaid. The Patient Centered Outcomes Research Institute 
(PCORI), the agency created by the ACA to plan and pay for 
studies of tests’ and treatments’ comparative effectiveness, is the 
biggest funder of such research.152 This research is a classic 
“public good” in the economics sense,153 supplied at suboptimal 
levels by health care providers, insurers, and other market ac-
tors.154 Stifling PCORI’s ability to compare the cost-effectiveness 
of alternative diagnostic and therapeutic approaches shrinks the 
evidence base concerning clinical value available to all health 
care payers, public and private. 
6. Medicare’s Separation of Decisions About Coverage and 
Payment 
Another obstacle to Medicare’s consideration of cost has its 
origins in the program’s original design. Medicare’s drafters cre-
ated separate schemes for deciding whether a clinical service or 
product should be covered and determining how much the gov-
ernment should pay for it.155 The former scheme requires Medi-
 
 152. Appleby, supra note 146. 
 153. Public Goods—The Economic Lowdown Podcast Series, FED. RES. BANK 
ST. LOUIS (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.stlouisfed.org/education/economic 
-lowdown-podcast-series/episode-17-public-goods [https://perma.cc/6WEK 
-A38R]. A public good is nonexcludable, meaning everyone may consume it, and 
nonrivalrous, meaning “one person’s consumption does not hinder anyone else’s 
consumption of the good.” Id. 
 154. Health care providers and drug- and device-makers have suboptimal 
economic incentives to do high-quality comparative-effectiveness research since 
they gain more in the marketplace by promoting their products than by doing 
studies that might show their services and products to be inferior. And private 
insurers have insufficient incentives to perform this research since doing so 
yields insufficient competitive advantage. If the research is published (or other-
wise made public), all insurers will be able to use it. But if the insurer that 
performs it keeps the findings (and ensuing payment protocols) proprietary, de-
nials of coverage on the basis of these findings will breed distrust, undermining 
the insurer’s business. 
 155. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(l)(1) (2012) (describing covered expenses as those 
that are “reasonable and necessary”); 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(b) (2012) (describing 
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care to cover care it deems “reasonable and necessary” (a stand-
ard borrowed from private insurance contracts)—language that 
Medicare’s administrators have never construed to permit the 
weighing of costs.156 Medicare’s payment practices have evolved 
over the past half-century, but the program’s authorizing statute 
and its several revisions have never linked prices paid for par-
ticular tests or treatments to their effects on length or quality of 
life.157 
When, in 2004, Medicare officials nevertheless tried to take 
costs into account by permitting contractors (who administer 
 
fee schedules as based on the service’s “relative value,” “conversion factor,” and 
“geographic adjustment factor”). 
 156. The term “reasonable” invites interpretations that allow consideration 
of cost—indeed this term is routinely understood in tort and administrative law 
to permit, even require, cost-benefit balancing. But the agency that administers 
Medicare (known as the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) until 
2001, then the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) thereafter) 
has never construed “reasonable” along these lines. To be sure, HCFA and CMS 
have, since 1989, several times explored the possibility of weighing costs when 
making coverage decisions: the agency has gone as far as to propose decision-
making rules that explicitly incorporate cost concerns. Jacqueline Fox, The Hid-
den Role of Cost: Medicare Decisions, Transparency and Public Trust, 79 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2010). But the agency has always backed off in the face of 
strong resistance from stakeholders and Congress, id. at 14, further evidence of 
the practical impossibility of openly withholding potentially-beneficial care on 
cost grounds. 
 157. Originally, Medicare payments to hospitals and physicians were set on 
a fee-for-service basis, via formulae that took into account individual institu-
tions’ costs and prices charged to private payers by local providers. Kathryn M. 
Langwell & James P. Hadley, Capitation and the Medicare Program: History, 
Issues, and Evidence, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Dec. 1986, at 9, 9–10. In 
1983, Congress introduced payment to acute-care hospitals via “diagnostic re-
lated groupings” (DRGs)—diagnostic categories for which fees were set (after 
adjustment for local differences in costs). Elizabeth Davis, Diagnostic Related 
Grouping and How It Works, VERYWELL HEALTH, https://www.verywellhealth 
.com/drg-101-what-is-a-drg-how-does-it-work-3916755 [https://perma.cc/492D 
-23T7] (last updated Mar. 20, 2019). Eight years later, Congress introduced the 
so-called “Resource-Based Relative Value Scale” (RBRVS) for Medicare physi-
cians’ fees: this scheme scores physician services based on doctors’ training, ef-
fort, and other costs rather than therapeutic impact. Congress and CMS have 
since pursued a series of payment experiments designed to incentivize quality 
of performance with little to no regard for tests’ and treatments’ comparative 
effectiveness. See generally Alan Weil et al., Securing the Future of Value-Based 
Payment, HEALTH AFF. (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10 
.1377/hp20170418.689533/full/ [https://perma.cc/6GCR-RRHQ] (discussing 
ACA provisions’ focus on value rather than volume and the effect on health care 
system efficiencies). 
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health care providers’ compensation) to pay for prescribed treat-
ment no more than the price of the “reasonably feasible and med-
ically appropriate” “least costly alternative,”158 they were sty-
mied by stakeholders and the courts.159 Health care providers 
pushed back, charging that the “least costly alternative” policy 
invited withholding of beneficial care on account of cost.160 They 
had a point: the terms “reasonably feasible” and “medically ap-
propriate” give Medicare contractors discretion to choose, as 
benchmarks, “least costly alternative(s)” that forgo therapeutic 
benefit.161 
As provider opposition mounted, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals killed this experiment in cost-awareness, ruling that 
Medicare’s separate coverage decision-making and price-setting 
schemes barred the program from tying payment rates to thera-
peutic effectiveness.162 Once Medicare chose to cover a treatment 
as “reasonable and necessary,” the court held, it was required to 
set prices based on statutory formulae, without regard for 
whether the program’s administrators “determined that the ex-
pense of an item or service” was “reasonable or necessary.”163 
 
 158. Medicare Program Integrity Manual, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDI-
CAID SERVS.(Apr. 25, 2008), http://www.cms.gov/manuals/downloads/ 
pim83c13.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AC4-42ZG] (identifying section 13.4.A, part of 
Revision 71, adopted on Apr. 9, 2004). 
 159. See Hays v. Sebelius, 589 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Nothing in 
the statute authorizes the least costly alternative policy.”). 
 160. See The ‘Least Costly Alternative’ Approach for Payment of Medicare 
Part B Drugs, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Mar. 2016), https://www.pewtrusts 
.org/-/media/assets/2016/03/the_least_costly_alternative_approach_for_ 
payment_of_medicare_part_b_drugs.pdf [https://perma.cc/682A-4ZYZ] (describ-
ing critics’ characterization of the policy as “inappropriate and unfair”). 
 161. “Reasonable” is often understood in tort and administrative law as 
shorthand for balancing benefits against costs. Supra text accompanying notes 
108–09. Likewise, “feasible” has long been understood in administrative law as 
permissive of agency policies that weigh costs. E.g., Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. 
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 637 (1980). And the term “medically appropriate” 
confers broad license to choose from among alternative clinical practices that 
reflect varying implicit balances between benefit and cost. BLOCHE, supra note 
46, at 23–29, 105–06. 
 162. Hays, 589 F.3d at 1281–82. 
 163. Id. at 1282 (internal quotations omitted). 
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C. STAKEHOLDERS, EXPECTATIONS, AND LEVERS OF INFLUENCE 
The myriad actors that provide $3.5 trillion in health care 
services and products per year164 do business within this cul-
tural, financial, and legal milieu. This environment rewards in-
dustry actors for developing and marketing new technologies 
with little regard for their degree of therapeutic benefit. Doctors, 
hospitals, and other health care providers, in turn, have power-
ful incentives to adopt these technologies and to invest in the 
training, equipment, and bricks and mortar needed to deploy 
them. The psychology of rescue, the ethical and legal architec-
ture that reflects and reinforces it, and the public and private 
insurance schemes that finance it lock in these incentives for the 
long term. This lowers the risk attached to the investments these 
incentives invite. 
Moreover, once industry actors make these investments, 
they are strongly motivated to protect them. Efforts by health 
care payers or government regulators to restrain spending on 
services to which industry actors have made large business com-
mitments are sure to meet fierce resistance. This resistance em-
ploys multiple tools: advocacy that exploits the legal doctrines 
and regimes we’ve discussed, political messaging that leverages 
popular outrage over the withholding of life-prolonging care, and 
marketing that stokes hopes for life-changing therapeutic im-
pact. 
 
 164. Sisko et al., supra note 14 (reporting total U.S. medical spending in 
2017). 
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Trade associations,165 corporate advocacy166 and market-
ing167 arms, and “astroturf” consumer groups168 funded by indus-
try stakeholders169 press the case for coverage of expensive tests 
and treatments. These actors also reach prescribing and refer-
ring physicians directly, through their dominant role in funding 
continuing medical education (and shaping its content)170 and 
 
 165. The American Medical Association (AMA) has long been seen as the 
marquee trade group when it comes to influence on politics, legislation, and reg-
ulation in the health sphere, but medical specialty societies are eclipsing its 
influence. Other powerful influencers include the American Hospital Associa-
tion, the Federation of American Hospitals (investor-owned hospitals), the As-
sociation of Academic Health Centers, the Pharmaceutical Research and Man-
ufacturers of America (PhARMA), and the Medical Device Manufacturers 
Association (MDMA). 
 166. Investor-owned and non-profit hospital systems and pharmaceutical 
and medical-device firms operate their own legislative and regulatory advocacy 
shops, retain outside lawyers and lobbyists, back political candidates, and oth-
erwise exercise enormous influence on federal and state healthcare policy. Jen-
nifer Liberto, Health Care Lobbying: Political Power Machine, CNNMONEY.COM 
(Sept. 13, 2009, 6:47 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2009/09/08/news/economy/ 
health_care_lobbying/?postversion=2009090813 [https://perma.cc/738N-8553]. 
 167. Through image advertising and promotion of products and services (to 
clinicians and to consumers directly), industry actors exercise large influence 
on public perceptions, shaping consumers’ expectations of particular products 
and services and of medical technology more generally. Michael S. Wilkes et al., 
Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising: Trends, Impact, and Impli-
cations, 19 HEALTH AFF. 110, 119–20 (2000). 
 168. “Astroturf” advocacy groups are entities fronted by apparent grassroots 
activists but created and funded by industry stakeholders, with an eye toward 
creating the illusion of broad, grassroots support for the stakeholders’ positions 
on issues. HEDRICK SMITH, THE POWER GAME: HOW WASHINGTON WORKS 245–
46 (1988). 
 169. Lauren Clason & Andrew Siddons, Health Industry Reports Lobbying 
Costs the Size of a Grapefruit—Drugmakers Lead, ROLL CALL (Oct. 23, 2018, 
1:53 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/health-industry-led-by 
-drugmakers-report-big-lobbying-costs [https://perma.cc/RE33-XG29]. 
 170. JEROME P. KASSIRER, ON THE TAKE: HOW MEDICINE’S COMPLICITY 
WITH BIG BUSINESS CAN ENDANGER YOUR HEALTH 15–16 (2005). Physicians are 
captive audiences for CME—states impose annual CME requirements for con-
tinued licensure, medical specialty societies require it for ongoing certification, 
and many hospitals make it a prerequisite for admitting and operating privi-
leges. See Physician CME State Map, RELIAS MEDIA, https://www.reliasmedia 
.com/pages/cme-state-map?utm_campaign=featuredsidebar&utm_medium= 
web&utm_source=cmeweb.com [https://perma.cc/8D92-7K38] (last updated 
June 21, 2019) (detailing license requirements by state). Through vehicles like 
Medscape (which gives physicians access to a massive selection of free, industry-
funded online CME), conference sponsorships, and “gifts” to hospitals and clin-
ics to support presentations, drug and device makers influence the content of 
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their financial support for so-called “key opinion leaders”171 
(prominent academic and other specialists whose pronounce-
ments influence standards of care). Direct-to-consumer, “ask 
your doctor” advertising, moreover, mobilizes patients to seek 
out pricey drugs, devices, and services.172 News outlets report 
uncritically (sometimes prompted by stakeholders’ promotional 
efforts) on the promise of new therapies.173 Patients and their 
families, in turn, pursue them, pressing their doctors for pre-
scriptions and referrals. Physicians, motivated to satisfy their 
patients, comply, aiding in the establishment of these therapies 
as standards of care, often before their efficacy has been scientif-
ically established.174 
These dynamics of influence play out within an environment 
made favorable by Americans’ reverence for technology, the 
hopes and fears of patients and family members who face dire 
 
CME, both directly and by choosing topics and speakers. AVORN, supra note 
130. 
 171. Pharmaceutical firms, device manufacturers, and other industry actors 
fund these physicians’ research studies, appoint them to paid advisory boards, 
and retain them as consultants. This process is subtle—outright payments for 
product endorsements are rare; rather, it relies on the building of relationships 
and trust over time. See Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical 
Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 373, 375–78 (2000) 
(comparing frequency of physician interactions with pharmaceutical industry 
representatives and corresponding outcomes). 
 172. Ram Bala & Pradeep Bhardwaj, Detailing vs. Direct-to-Consumer Ad-
vertising in the Prescription Pharmaceutical Industry, 56 MGMT. SCI. 148, 148–
49 (2010). 
 173. See, e.g., Apoorva Mandavilli, A Simple Regimen Can Prevent TB. Why 




[https://perma.cc/XVK9-WMEG] (reporting on a new drug therapy for tubercu-
losis). 
 174. Examples of technology adoption catalyzed by industry promotional ef-
forts, absent good scientific evidence, include CT angiography; see Julie Ap-
pleby, The Case of CT Angiography: How Americans View and Embrace New 
Technology, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1515, 1517 (2008) (reporting on how GE and car-
diologists who purchased GE cardiac CT scanners lobbied Congress to press 
Medicare to broaden its coverage criteria for these scans absent supporting ev-
idence), and estrogen replacement therapy for post-menopausal women to pre-
vent cardiovascular disease. See ELIZABETH SIEGEL WATKINS, THE ESTROGEN 
ELIXIR: A HISTORY OF HORMONE REPLACEMENT THERAPY IN AMERICA 243 
(2007) (discussing estrogen’s rise in popularity, which was buoyed by drug man-
ufacturers’ efforts). 
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medical circumstances, and the trust in physicians that patients 
sustain, indeed feel more deeply, when they hear bad health 
news.175 Healthcare reformers from across the ideological spec-
trum have proposed myriad policy fixes. Liberals have focused 
on limiting corporate influence on medical research and practice, 
eliminating financial conflicts of interest,176 empowering govern-
ment to stop the spread of low-value services, and protecting pa-
tients’ autonomy from paternalistic physicians. Conservatives 
have urged an array of consumer-choice approaches, from offer-
ing patients a wide variety of cost-benefit trade-off policies at the 
health plan sign-up stage177 to shifting clinical costs from health 
insurers to patients (by raising copayments and deductibles).178 
These solutions fly in the face of the powerful forces we’ve 
described. They assume, rather than offer, answers to the Gor-
dian web of challenges we’ve set out—the psychological and cul-
tural forces, stakeholder expectations, and ethical and legal 
frameworks that reflect and reinforce our national inability to 
say “no” to high-cost, low-value care once it becomes available. 
These challenges stand in the way of adoption of the reforms that 
liberals and conservatives have urged. For more than a half cen-
tury, they have stymied medical cost-containment efforts regard-
less of ideological pedigree.179 
D. A LIGHTNING-ROUND REVIEW OF FAILED COST-CONTROL 
POLICY 
Prior to the creation of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, ris-
ing health spending wasn’t a matter of much interest to federal 
policymakers. To be sure, critics of these programs objected to 
burdening taxpayers with their costs,180 but future escalation of 
 
 175. See KATZ, supra note 59 at 100–01 (contending that patients tend to 
regress to more childlike, trusting states of mind—and thus experience greater 
trust in their physicians—when they fear for their health). 
 176. E.g., Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts of Interest, Institutional Corruption, 
and Pharma: An Agenda for Reform, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 511, 511 (2012). 
 177. E.g., HAVIGHURST, supra note 98. 
 178. E.g., CHARLES SILVER & DAVID A. HYMAN, OVERCHARGED: WHY AMER-
ICANS PAY TOO MUCH FOR HEALTH CARE 284, 287 (2018). 
 179. See supra text accompanying notes 158–59. 
 180. Most famously, in 1961 the actor-turned-political-commentator Ronald 
Reagan condemned use of tax dollars to pay for medical care for the elderly, 
disabled, and poor as “socialism.” ReaganFoundation, Ronald Reagan Speaks 
Out on Socialized Medicine—Audio, YOUTUBE (July 23, 2009), https://www 
.youtube.com/watch?v=AYrlDlrLDSQ [https://perma.cc/N5NP-9CTQ].  
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medical spending wasn’t this opposition’s focus. Leading health 
economists presumed that physicians’ Hippocratic devotion to 
their patients would guard against excessive spending,181 and 
the programs’ drafters gave the medical profession virtual carte 
blanche to determine clinical need.182 But within a few years of 
these programs’ implementation, their soaring costs were arous-
ing Congressional alarm. A 1969 Senate Finance Committee re-
port projected Medicare’s fiscal year 1970 price tag at almost 
double the amount anticipated in 1965.183 Comparable projec-
tions aren’t available for Medicaid, but over the program’s first 
five years, its total cost to federal, state, and local governments 
jumped by more than 300%.184 
1. Health Planning 
After years of debate over rival regulatory and market-ori-
ented remedies, Congress settled in 1974 on a scheme that 
sought to control costs by limiting the supply of high-priced clin-
ical services.185 It required each state to establish a network of 
local and statewide bodies—some with stakeholder representa-
tives—to create comprehensive plans for capital investment—
plans for numbers of hospital beds and for myriad specialized 
 
 181. See, e.g., Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of 
Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 947–48 (1963) (analyzing physicians’ 
Hippocratic altruism as a market response to the possibility that patients’ med-
ical ignorance could give rise to distrust). 
 182. Like private insurers, Medicare covered clinical services so long as 
treating physicians deemed them “necessary,” with minimal review of treating 
doctors’ decisions. See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text. 
 183. STAFF OF THE S. COMM. ON FIN., 91ST CONG., STAFF DATA RELATING TO 
MEDICAID-MEDICARE STUDY 10 (Comm. Print 1969) (noting increase in pro-
jected fiscal year 1970 spending from $2.9 billion in 1965 to $5 billion in 1969). 
 184. Id. at 2 (“Between 1965 and 1970, total Federal, State, and local costs 
will have risen from $1.3 to $5.5 billion.”). 
 185. See National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, 
Pub. L. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300k–
300n-5) repealed by Pub. L. 99-660, title VII, § 701(a), 100 Stat. 3743, 3799 
(1986). The premise behind this approach was that insurance induces sufficient 
demand to fill available hospital beds, surgical suites, and other high-cost clin-
ical facilities, making regulatory constraints on supply critical to cost contain-
ment. See Milton I. Roemer, Bed Supply and Hospital Utilization: A Natural 
Experiment, 178 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 989, 991–92 (1961) (setting out and testing 
this premise, which became known as “Roemer’s Law”). 
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facilities and services.186 Proposed new hospitals and other facil-
ities that exceeded these plans could, in theory, not be built; the 
idea was to cap availability of costly care in the face of insatiable, 
insurance-fueled demand. 
But stakeholders’ resistance ensured that this lid on supply 
would leak freely. The 1974 statutory scheme that engineered it 
denied health planners the power to shut down existing facilities 
even when they offered capacity that exceeded planners’ pre-
scribed limits. And mechanisms of political influence—from 
health-care industry representation on local planning bodies to 
doctors’ and hospitals’ sway over state officials—eased health-
care providers’ way to obtaining state approval (known as a “Cer-
tificate of Need” or “CON”) for new facilities.187 Regulators ap-
pointed by or accountable to governors and legislators had little 
incentive to anger providers by saying no. 
Doctors and hospitals, moreover, could and did mobilize 
public support by warning that refusal to confer Certificates of 
Need put lives and well-being at risk.188 And when regulators 
withheld approvals, providers often appealed to the courts,189 ex-
ploiting judges’ reluctance to risk adverse health consequences. 
Protracted litigation and remands to regulators for reconsidera-
tion often ensued as judges strained to avoid visibly compromis-
ing people’s health. In short, the interwoven personal psychol-
ogy, public expectations, professional ideals, and stakeholder 
interests that we’ve described190 ensured health planning’s fail-
ure as a remedy for rising costs. Eliminating only care that 
lacked any therapeutic value (or worse, did more harm than 
good) wasn’t enough to restrain medical spending’s explosive 
growth—growth sustained by insurance-fueled technological ad-
vance that too often yielded little therapeutic value.191 To suc-
 
 186. See National Health Planning and Resources Development Act 
§§ 1512–12, 1522–23. 
 187. See id. § 1523(a)(4)(A). 
 188. See generally David Mechanie, The Managed Care Backlash: Percep-
tions and Rhetoric in Health Care Policy and the Potential for Health Care Re-
form, 79 MILBANK Q. 35, 38–41 (2001) (highlighting various contributing factors 
to the managed care backlash, including dissatisfied physicians). 
 189. See, e.g., Nat’l Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross of 
Kansas City, 452 U.S. 378, 380–81 (1981). 
 190. See, e.g., supra Part I.A. 
 191. See, e.g., supra Part I.B.4. 
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ceed, health planners would have had to make compromises be-
tween health and other social needs that the surrounding ecol-
ogy of beliefs and interests disallowed. 
2. Hospital Rate Regulation 
The same was the case for another early regulatory response 
to rising costs—the capping of hospital rates. By the end of the 
1970s, hospital rate regulation had proven effective at slowing 
the growth of clinical spending.192 Not only did it contain inpa-
tient costs (the largest component of U.S. medical spending193); 
its spillover effects likely included lower spending on physician 
services.194 The several states that adopted it195 achieved cost 
control that Certificate-of-Need regulation didn’t match.196 En-
couraged by this success, the Carter Administration proposed a 
nationwide hospital rate-setting scheme in 1979.197 
But industry resistance kept this regulatory model from 
spreading. Hospital executives mobilized opposition by warning 
 
 192. See PAUL L. JOSKOW, CONTROLLING HOSPITAL COSTS: THE ROLE OF 
GOVERNMENT REGULATION 139–68 (1981) (examining the economic effects of 
government regulation of hospital rates). 
 193. For the past fifty years, spending on hospital care has comprised be-
tween one third and two fifths of U.S. medical costs, more than spending on 
physician services, pharmaceuticals, or any other clinical sector. See National 
Health Expenditures by Type of Service and Source of Funds, CMS, https://www 
.cms.gov/ (follow “Research, Statistics, Data, & Systems” hyperlink; then follow 
the “National Health Expenditure Data” hyperlink under the “Statistics, 
Trends, & Reports” tab; then follow the “Historical” hyperlink) [https://perma 
.cc/2LG9-DEQY].  
 194. See ROBERT MURRAY & ROBERT BERENSON, URBAN INST., HOSPITAL 
RATE SETTING REVISITED: DUMB PRICE FIXING OR A SMART SOLUTION TO PRO-
VIDER PRICING POWER AND DELIVERY REFORM? 60–61 (2015) (“[S]tudies sug-
gest that spending for physician services was lower in states with rate set-
ting . . . .”). 
 195. David A. Crozier, State Rate Setting: A Status Report, HEALTH AFF., 
Summer 1982, at 66 (identifying the seven states with mandatory rate control 
programs at the time: New York, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, Washington, and Wisconsin).  
 196. JOSKOW, supra note 192, at 76–80 (comparing results from Certificate-
of-Need and hospital rate regulation). 
 197. See Jimmy Carter, Hospital Cost Containment Message to the Congress 





2019] HEALTH CARE COSTS  999 
 
that rate setting compromised quality of care.198 Physicians re-
inforced these warnings, arguing that restraints on inpatient 
rates rendered hospitals less able to build new facilities, acquire 
state-of-the-art technology, and thereby save lives.199 President 
Carter’s rate-setting proposal went nowhere, and by 1980 a 
state-level retreat from hospital rate regulation was well under-
way.200 That these admonitions about health care quality gained 
enough political traction to roll back rate regulation despite its 
cost-control success underscores our national resistance to trade-
offs between medicine’s benefits and other human needs. 
3. The Market Responds: Managed Care 
Through the 1970s, private health insurers paid doctors and 
hospitals virtually on demand, without critical review of the 
medical rationale for tests and treatments. But as support for 
regulatory responses to rising costs ebbed in the 1980s, health 
plans (and employers, who pay for most private coverage) as-
serted their market power. They declined coverage, at times, for 
costly services, citing “medical necessity” clauses in their con-
tracts with subscribers.201 They offered financial rewards to phy-
sicians for frugal practice and made compliance with money-sav-
ing clinical protocols a precondition for participation in provider 
networks.202 To put market muscle behind these new ways of do-
ing business, they offered patients steep discounts for choosing 
in-network doctors and hospitals; this, in turn, enabled health 
 
 198. See Crozier, supra note 195, at 68–70. 
 199. House Kills Carter Hospital Cost Control Plan, 35 CQ ALMANAC 512, 
513 (1979). The Federation of American Hospitals, the American Hospital As-
sociation, and the American Medical Association “suggested the bill would harm 
health care in the United States by forcing hospitals to curtail services to keep 
down costs.” Id. 
 200. See John E. McDonough, Tracking the Demise of State Hospital Rate 
Setting, HEALTH AFF., Jan.–Feb. 1997, at 142, 143–44. 
 201. See Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment 
of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1641 (1992) (opining that “previ-
ous contract disputes involved treatment at the periphery of traditional medi-
cine with only modest amounts of money at stake” but, with medical necessity 
clauses, “the stakes are much higher on both sides”). 
 202. See generally Linda J. White & John Ball, Integrating Practice Guide-
lines with Financial Incentives, 16 QUALITY REV. BULL. 50, 51–52 (1990) (antic-
ipating that the results of medical effectiveness studies will be used to inform 
physicians and patients about appropriate medical care and to assist public and 
private insurers in developing coverage policy). 
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plans to reward compliant providers with larger numbers of pa-
tients.203 
By the early 1990s, the insurance industry had evolved a 
medley of health plan designs that made use of varying mixes of 
these methods, all the while continuing to promise, via contract, 
“medically necessary” care.204 Federal law favored these designs, 
which came to be known as “managed care.” A 1973 statute sup-
plied subsidies to HMOs that employed these methods, pre-
empted state laws restricting them, and required employers of-
fering health insurance to include an HMO option.205 And the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)206 gave carte 
blanche to medical-necessity-based coverage denials through its 
preemption of state tort and contract law.207 ERISA preemption 
barred Americans who obtained coverage via the workplace from 
suing their health plans for consequential damages; they could 
sue (in federal court) only for the value of the benefits denied.208 
Public programs likewise embraced managed care. State 
Medicaid programs experimented with HMOs in the 1980s, then 
 
 203. See generally Peter D. Fox & Peter R. Kongstvedt, A History of Managed 
Health Care and Health Insurance in the United States, in THE ESSENTIALS OF 
MANAGED HEALTH CARE 7 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 5th ed. 2007) (exploring 
the development of managed health care and coinciding health insurance mod-
els in the United States). 
 204. M. Gregg Bloche, One Step Ahead of the Law: Market Pressures and the 
Evolution of Managed Care, in THE PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: 
LEGAL AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES 27–33 (M. Gregg Bloche ed., 2003) (not-
ing the agility of the market’s response to consumer concerns). 
 205. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 
Stat. 914 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e–14a (1978)).  
 206. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 
88 Stat. 832 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–461 (2012)). 
 207. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62 (1985) (“[Plaintiff]’s 
common law contract and tort claims are pre-empted by ERISA.”). 
 208. Fully-integrated HMOs—firms that provided health insurance and 
medical services within a single corporate structure—were (and are) not pro-
tected by this de facto tort immunity. Lower federal courts construed ERISA to 
preempt state damage suits against insurers for denial of coverage (since ERISA 
preempted such damage suits against employee benefit plans) but not suits 
against fully-integrated HMOs for failure to provide adequate care. See, e.g., 
Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 356 (1995) (holding that such a 
claim against an HMO is beyond the scope of ERISA pre-emption because it 
“merely attack[s] the quality of the benefits received”). 
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moved most of their clients to managed care in the 1990s.209 
Medicare managed care also grew rapidly in the 1990s (though 
most Medicare beneficiaries stayed with traditional, fee-for-ser-
vice coverage).210 
For several years, in the mid to late 1990s, U.S. medical 
costs stabilized as a share of GDP,211 due largely to rapid transi-
tion from traditional fee-for-service to managed care. HMOs and 
other aggressively-managed health plans cost less, compared to 
traditional coverage, though their annual price increases were 
roughly similar.212 But managed care had hidden a core truth. 
As a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court put it in 2000: “inducement 
to ration care goes to the very point of any HMO scheme.”213 
HMOs struck balances, the Court noted, concerning “acceptable 
medical risk” and “optimum treatment levels”214—balances that 
sacrificed therapeutic benefit to conserve resources for other 
purposes. So did other forms of managed care, drawing upon fi-
nancial inducements, administrative controls, and bargaining 
power over providers to contain clinical resource use.215 
Managed health plans didn’t admit to doing this.216 They hid 
the reality of rationing behind the euphemism of medical neces-
sity, insisting that they were honoring their contractual commit-
ments to cover all care that met this standard.217 For a time, they 
 
 209. See Carlos Zarabozo, Milestones in Medicare Managed Care, 22 
HEALTHCARE FINANCING REV., Fall 2000, at 61, 64–65 (describing the “fits and 
starts” of Medicaid programs in the late 1980s and early 1990s). 
 210. See id. at 61, 65. A variety of legislative and regulatory changes nur-
tured Medicare managed care’s growth, to more than fifteen percent of all Med-
icare beneficiaries by 1999. Id. 
 211. Sheiner, supra note 12. 
 212. Zarabozo, supra note 209, at 61–62. 
 213. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 221 (2000). 
 214. Id. 
 215. See Bloche, Invention of Health Law, supra note 40, at 253, 287–98 
(elaborating on techniques utilized in attempts to fine-tune health care effi-
ciency); Bloche, Trust and Betrayal, supra note 101, at 935–39, 938 n.94 (dis-
cussing the relationship between trust and the creation of unrealistic expecta-
tions in consumers and patients). 
 216. See Robert Pear, The ‘R’ Word: Justice Souter Takes on a Health Care 
Taboo, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2000, at WK3 (discussing how the essence of the 
HMO concept is rationing, even if that is not expressly stated by the plans them-
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 217. See id.; see also Hall & Anderson, supra note 201, at 1639 n.12, 1640–
41, 1640 nn.13–14 (listing and elaborating on litigation surrounding the con-
struction of “medical necessity” language in health insurance contracts where 
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seemed to pull off health policy’s impossible feat—withholding 
beneficial, even lifesaving care in order to restrain costs (and 
thereby succeeding where health planners218 and hospital rate 
regulators219 failed). 
But this time was short. As managed care spread across pri-
vate insurance markets in the 1990s, its covert cost-saving prac-
tices gained notice and aroused ire.220 Many were shocked to 
learn that ERISA, in most cases,221 immunized health plans 
against liability for the consequences of coverage denied. Con-
gress and many state legislatures advanced “Patients’ Bill of 
Rights” proposals222 to limit health plans’ discretion to deny cov-
erage and to expand patients’ legal remedies. Legislative hear-
ings and investigative journalists spotlighted egregious episodes 
of harm resulting from care withheld.223 Class action suits, em-
ploying a potpourri of legal theories, targeted managed care’s 
 
insurers maintained that they were honoring their contractual commitments to 
that language). 
 218. See supra Part I.D.1. 
 219. See supra Part I.D.2. 
 220. See Robert J. Blendon et al., Understanding the Managed Care Back-
lash, HEALTH AFF., July–Aug. 1998, at 80, 82–85 (studying and then discussing 
public opinion of managed care and its influencing factors); Alain C. Enthoven 
& Sara J. Singer, The Managed Care Backlash and the Task Force in California, 
HEALTH AFF., July–Aug. 1998, at 90, 96–97 (discussing contributions to the 
backlash towards managed care by various groups). 
 221. In the 1990s (as is the case today), more than 150 million Americans 
received health insurance via the workplace and were thus precluded by ERISA 
preemption from seeking state tort or contract damages for the consequences of 
coverage denials. See supra, text accompanying notes 206–08 (discussing 
ERISA-controlled health benefits plans). See generally Cynthia B. Sullivan & 
Thomas Rice, Datawatch: The Health Insurance Picture In 1990, HEALTH AFF., 
Summer 1991, at 104, 104–05 (listing and discussing data on employer-provided 
health insurance in 1990); Dan Managan, Number of People with Health Insur-
ance via Jobs Remained Steady with Obamacare, CNBC (July 13, 2016), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/13/number-of-people-with-health-insurance-via 
-jobs-remained-steady-with-obamacare.html [https://perma.cc/LY5L-2KM9] 
(“There are an estimated 155 million people under age 65 covered by [employer-
sponsored insurance] plans.”). 
 222. See M.J. Binette, Patients’ Bill of Rights: Legislative Cure-All or Pre-
scription for Disaster?, 81 N.C. L. REV. 653, 673–88 (2003) (discussing States’ 
efforts to pass such bills); Faith McLellan, U.S. House Passes Patients’ Bill of 
Rights, 358 LANCET 480 (2001) (discussing the bills advanced in Congress). 
 223. See, e.g., Stuart Auerbach, Managed Care Backlash, WASH. POST: 
HEALTH, June 25, 1996, at 12. 
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cost-cutting practices.224 And in TV dramas,225 films,226 and late-
night comedy,227 health insurers became villains and punch-
lines. 
Efforts to enact a federal “Patients’ Bill of Rights” failed.228 
Class action suits against managed health plans were thrown 
out before they could reach the discovery stage.229 Employment-
based health insurance retained its ERISA immunity from dam-
age suits.230 But the reputational damage had been done. Con-
sumers shied away from the most restrictive health plans.231 
Employers, in the late 1990s, were less inclined to offer them, 
 
 224. See M. Gregg Bloche & David M. Studdert, A Quiet Revolution: Law as 
an Agent of Health System Change, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 29, 36–
37. 
 225. See, e.g., Jill Wechsler, HMOs Go Hollywood, MANAGED HEALTHCARE 
EXECUTIVE (Aug. 1, 2002), http://managedhealthcareexecutive.modernmedicine 
.com/managed-healthcare-executive/content/hmos-go-hollywood (reporting on 
the leading managed care trade association’s retaining of a Hollywood agent to 
push back against unfavorable portrayals of the industry in popular television 
dramas).  
 226. E.g., AS GOOD AS IT GETS (TriStar Pictures 1997) (health insurer re-
fuses to cover costly asthma care for the son of Helen Hunt’s character, a strug-
gling waitress); THE RAINMAKER (Constellation Entertainment 1997) (Matt Da-
mon and Danny DeVito are lawyers who defeat a villainous insurance company 
in court after it refuses to cover treatment for a child with leukemia). 
 227. E.g., The Tonight Show with Jay Leno: Episode #8.252 (NBC television 
broadcast Aug. 23, 2000) (making fun of HMOs for supposedly requiring pa-
tients consult with the doctor in a group rather than individually in an effort to 
cut costs). 
 228. Many states enacted “Patients’ Bill of Rights” laws, offering widely-var-
ying protections, albeit limited by ERISA preemption. See generally Binette, su-
pra note 222, at 673–88 (2003) (discussing Texas, Georgia, and North Carolina, 
specifically). And by August 2, 2001, both houses of Congress had passed ver-
sions of a federal “Patients’ Bill of Rights,” triggering formation of a conference 
committee. McLellan, supra note 222, at 480 (2001) (discussing the differences 
between the version that passed the House and the version that passed the Sen-
ate). A month later, the 9/11 terror attacks transformed Congress’s agenda, and 
the conference-committee process never progressed. 
 229. Bloche & Studdert, supra note 224, at 29. 
 230. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) (upholding a 
sweeping view of ERISA preemption that prevents states from enacting statutes 
making employment-based health insurance liable in tort for coverage denials). 
 231. See Bloche & Studdert, supra note 224, at 37 (discussing consumer anx-
iety with managed care plans); Jerome Dugan, Trends in Managed Care Cost 
Containment: An Analysis of the Managed Care Backlash, 24 HEALTH ECON. 
1604, 1606 (2015) (compiling and discussing data that show rapid disenrollment 
from managed care plans). 
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especially as the U.S. economy neared full employment, height-
ening competition for workers.232 Capital markets, as well, sig-
naled their concerns, pushing share prices down in response to 
developments that sullied managed care’s image.233 Rather than 
responding with contractual transparency about rationing 
they’d previously kept covert, health plans backed away from ag-
gressive managed-care practices,234 aware that candor about for-
going therapeutic benefit to save money was no recipe for pre-
serving market share. 
The predictable result was that, after 2000, medical spend-
ing again began to rise more rapidly than GDP.235 Like health 
planning and hospital rate regulation, managed care’s methods 
could have contained medical spending by forcing trade-offs be-
tween therapeutic benefit and other social needs. But this would 
have required patients and their loved ones to accept such trade-
offs—and to tolerate their physicians’ leave-taking from the Hip-
pocratic ideal of undivided commitment to patients’ wellbeing. 
And it would have required the medical profession to embrace 
this sharp break with long-standing values. 
Such a radical departure from social expectations, sick peo-
ple’s emotional needs, and professional ideals was not in the 
cards. Managed care’s leaders understood this. So, they tried to 
keep rationing covert—hidden behind health insurers’ tradi-
tional contractual promise of “medically necessary” care.236 But 
America’s entrepreneurs of revelation—investigative journal-
ists, plaintiffs’ lawyers, consumer activists, academics, and cru-
sading legislators—exposed the reality of trade-offs between 
clinical benefits and costs.237 Even the U.S. Supreme Court got 
 
 232. See Bloche & Studdert, supra note 224, at 38 (noting “increased pres-
sure on health plans to move away from aggressive cost management”). 
 233. See id. at 37–38. 
 234. See Bloche, supra note 204 (noting the agility of the market’s response 
to consumer concerns); Dugan, supra note 231, at 1604–05 (discussing organi-
zational awareness of backlash against managed care). 
 235. Sheiner, supra note 12. 
 236. See Zarabozo, supra note 209, at 61–62; see also Hall & Anderson, supra 
note 201, at 1640–41 (identifying instances where managed care insurers’ com-
mitment to the “medically necessary” language in their policies lead to litiga-
tion). 
 237. See supra Part I.C. 
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into the act, invoking health care’s “R-word”238 seven times239 (in 
its 2000 opinion rejecting an ERISA challenge to rewards to doc-
tors for withholding services240) to drive home the message that 
HMOs reduce spending by rationing care. Keeping this rationing 
on the down-low was doomed to fail. 
4. Top-Down Caps on Medical Spending 
A government or private entity can control medical spending 
by keeping to budget ceilings for hospitals, clinics, or geographic 
regions. Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom are among 
the nations that set such ceilings.241 Countries can do so under 
both public and private health systems: under public schemes, 
governments allocate pre-set levels of funding, while under pri-
vate systems, regulators set spending limits.242 Canadian prov-
inces, for example, set global health-care budgets based on the 
funds they receive from Canada’s federal government, supple-
mented by provincial taxes; within these constraints, provinces 
then negotiate payments to providers.243 President Clinton’s 
failed health reform proposal featured a ceiling for most private 
medical spending: caps on insurance premiums were built into 
the proposal as a “backstop,” in case (as many expected) compe-
tition between health plans failed to keep premiums below leg-
islated limits.244 
Control of spending through top-down caps is simple in the-
ory. In practice, it runs afoul of the politics that beset any scheme 
 
 238. See generally Pear, supra note 216 (“Rationing is central to the very 
idea of H.M.O.s.”). 
 239. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 220–21, 231 (2000) (using “ration” 
and “rationing” seven times). 
 240. See id. at 235 (holding that ERISA’s fiduciary duty provisions permit 
employment-based health plans to offer doctors financial incentives to practice 
inexpensively). 
 241. See XINGZHU LIU, POLICY TOOLS FOR ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY OF 
HEALTH SERVICES 35 (2003). 
 242. See generally THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, INTERNATIONAL PROFILES 
OF HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS 12–15, 19–22, 28–31 (2010), http://www 
.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2010/Jun/ 
1417_Squires_Intl_Profiles_622.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XJN-PE7R] (discussing 
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 243. Id. at 12–15. 
 244. Walter A. Zelman, The Rationale Behind the Clinton Health Reform 
Plan, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1994, at 9, 21–23 (discussing a “backstop” premium 
cap mechanism). 
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of allocation within such caps. Ferocious struggles over fixed re-
sources are an ongoing feature of Britain’s National Health Ser-
vice and other public systems of health care provision.245 Acri-
mony over fees is a pervasive feature of schemes in which a 
single entity, public or private, constrained by a cap, pays pri-
vate providers. Claims that caps are too restrictive to cover 
needed, even lifesaving care are commonplace.246 So are the 
scandals that ensue when clinical caregivers elide gaps between 
constrained resources and public expectations by rationing cov-
ertly or resorting to disinformation247 about the care they pro-
vide. 
The Clinton health reform plan’s premium caps became a 
political target for critics, who gained traction with voters by 
charging that rationing would result.248 The ACA’s Medicare 
caps made it into law, only to be repealed in 2018 before they 
were triggered.249 Foes characterized these ceilings as a ration-
ing scheme and called the agency designed to implement them a 
“rationing board.”250 Pitted against public expectations, profes-
sional norms, and stakeholders’ political influence, spending 
ceilings have proven unsustainable in practice.251 
 
 245. E.g., Zara Aziz, The NHS No Longer Has the Resources to Care for Our 
Sick Population, GUARDIAN, (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
society/2017/jan/17/nhs-no-longer-resources-care-for-sick-population [https:// 
perma.cc/4PSR-V6J6]. 
 246. E.g., id. 
 247. See M. Gregg Bloche, Scandal as a Sentinel Event—Recognizing Hidden 
Cost-Quality Trade-offs, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1001, 1001–03 (2016) (analyzing 
similar dishonesty within the British National Health Service and the U.S. De-
partment of Veterans Affairs). 
 248. E.g., Robert Moffit, A Guide to the Clinton Health Plan, HERITAGE 
FOUND.: TALKING POINTS 3 (1993) https://www.heritage.org/health-care-reform/ 
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the Clinton health reform plan for necessitating the rationing of medical ser-
vices).  
 249. See supra text accompanying notes 151–52. 
 250. Killing ObamaCare’s Rationing Board, WALL ST. J. (July 1, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/killing-obamacares-rationing-board 
-1435790411 [https://perma.cc/FN9Z-C92W].  
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(e.g., Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany), these influences have 
pushed costs upward as percentages of GDP. Per capita spending on medicine 
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II.  BEYOND FUTILITY: AN EMERGENT STRATEGY   
Fifty years of failure have shown the unworkability of clini-
cal cost-control strategies that require the withholding of poten-
tially beneficial care. Even the appearance or hope of therapeutic 
benefit, absent a scientific showing of efficacy, makes it impossi-
ble to say “no” to already-established tests and treatments with-
out provoking fierce backlash. Health care policy and law have 
failed to come to terms with this. 
We therefore urge a sharply different approach. Rather than 
trying to roll back use of existing clinical approaches, we aim to 
bend the arc of future technology development, toward break-
through and other high-value treatments and away from the 
minimal therapeutic improvements that our current system in-
discriminately rewards. 
A. QUANTUM LEAPS V. “HALF-WAY TECHNOLOGIES” 
Our rationale rests on medical technology’s emergent 
logic.252 Therapies not yet available, even envisioned, don’t give 
rise to vested expectations. Investors, developers, and doctors 
and hospitals haven’t yet made large human and financial capi-
tal commitments. Patients and their loved ones aren’t outraged 
by inability to access technologies that don’t exist. Clinical ethics 
don’t demand their provision. Preventing the future develop-
ment of high-cost, low-benefit tests and treatments is thus 
achievable, whereas wholesale reduction in use of today’s pricey, 
low-yield technologies is out of reach. 
To this end, we urge the reshaping of incentives for technol-
ogy development down the line, so as to reward advances in pro-
portion to their therapeutic impact. Doing so won’t substantially 
cut current medical spending since it does nothing to discourage 
use of extant tests and treatments. But it would extract greater 
value from future health spending as technologies emerge, since 
reward for value would play a larger role in their emergence. 
 
=1566658625&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=AFB444AD6DB723B8 
F94562EF5162FD3E [https://perma.cc/F5QA-74RM] (comparing OECD coun-
tries’ inflation-adjusted average annual rates of growth in per capita health 
spending for 2003–09 and 2009–16; reporting that the U.S. average annual rate 
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 252. See generally M. Gregg Bloche, The Emergent Logic of Health Law, 82 
S. CAL. L. REV. 389, 423–28 (2009). 
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More than this, scaling economic rewards to therapeutic im-
pact would likely slow health spending’s long-term growth. 
Large therapeutic leaps forward typically arise from break-
throughs in biological understanding—breakthroughs that open 
the way to elegant clinical interventions.253 Such interventions 
are, in relative terms, simple to administer, decisive, and there-
fore cheap.254 They interact in sophisticated ways with biological 
systems to set them right.255  
By contrast, the highest-cost clinical measures tend to be, at 
once, sophisticated from an engineering perspective and crude in 
their biological action.256 They are “half-way technologies,” as 
the physician and philosopher of medicine Lewis Thomas called 
them257—substitutes, not fixes, for physiology gone awry. They 
employ costly personnel to run complex equipment—often for ex-
tended periods, since they do little to put our biology back on 
track.258 
Compare the antibiotic revolution, for example, to the tech-
nology in an intensive care unit. The discovery that substances 
found in nature could stop bacterial growth by blocking key 
chemical reactions enabled decisive action to cure dreaded dis-
eases.259 But ICU life-support systems are poor substitutes for 
 
 253. Cf. Arturo Casadevall & Ferric C. Fang, Elegant Science, MBIO, https:// 
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erally infra note 283 and accompanying text (discussing the research and devel-
opment costs of new pharmaceutical drugs). 
 255. BLOCHE, supra note 46, at 56. 
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normal biological functioning. Or, consider the Nobel-Prize-win-
ning research that revealed the pathways of lipid metabolism, 
opening the way for pharmaceutical intervention to stop the 
growth of artery-clogging plaques.260 The “statin” drugs emerged 
from this science.261 They’re remarkably cheap by comparison 
with the technology-intensive, biologically primitive measures 
undertaken in cardiac care units. 
Shifting clinical innovators’ calculus of risk and benefit to-
ward higher-value advances will push innovators toward invest-
ment in biological breakthroughs and away from the “half-way 
technologies” that are disproportionately responsible for rising 
costs. Over time, we project, the distribution of innovation will 
shift, from the latter toward the former, as changing rewards are 
felt. And if this happens, growth in health spending will gradu-
ally diminish, toward rates more in line with growth throughout 
the rest of our economy. 
To be sure, some quantum biological leaps yield pricey ther-
apies. A current, high-profile example is curative medication for 
hepatitis C, a viral infection that kills 400,000 each year.262 
Prices for a successful course of treatment approach $100,000.263 
But actual production costs for this course of treatment have 
been estimated at a few hundred dollars or less.264 The five-hun-
dred-fold or greater disconnect between production cost and 
price stems from industry’s strategic calculus about the charges 
health insurers will bear.265 Cure, moreover, averts the costs of 
 
 260. See Michael S. Brown & Joseph L. Goldstein, Familial Hypercholester-
olemia: Defective Binding of Lipoproteins to Cultured Fibroblasts Associated 
with Impaired Regulation of 3-Hydroxy-3-Methylglutaryl Coenzyme A Reduc-
tase Activity, 71 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 788 (1974).  
 261. BLOCHE, supra note 46, at 56. 




 263. Sy Mukherjee, Hepatitis C Drugs Can Cost $84,000. This New One May 
Be Just As Good—But Cost $300, FORTUNE (Apr. 12, 2018), http://fortune.com/ 
2018/04/12/hepatitis-c-cure-300-dollars/ [https://perma.cc/6T3W-XKGY]. 
 264. See Andrew Hillet al., Minimum Costs for Producing Hepatitis C Direct-
Acting Antivirals for Use in Large-Scale Treatment Access Programs in Devel-
oping Countries, 58 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 928, 930–33 (2014) (esti-
mating production costs for various antivirals). 
 265. See U.S. S. COMM. ON FIN., THE PRICE OF SOVALDI AND ITS IMPACT ON 
THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 29–78 (Comm. Print 2015) (discussing how the 
price of Sovaldi was determined). 
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half-way technologies for the management of liver failure and 
cancer,266 as well as the exorbitant costs of liver transplanta-
tion267 and the discomfort, debilitation, and productivity losses 
associated with infection. Curative antiviral medication, in 
short, almost certainly costs less than allowing infection to lin-
ger. 
Development of a cure for hepatitis C, often cited as a cau-
tionary tale about the cost of clinical breakthroughs, thus illus-
trates our claim about the cost-saving potential of biological 
leaps forward. In general, physiological “fixes” that solve serious 
health problems are cheaper than ongoing, technology-intensive 
(and thus labor and capital intensive) approaches to managing 
them.268 
There’s a dismal caveat here: the biomedical advance that 
enables decisive treatment for a life-threatening disease opens 
the way for future illnesses that death would have forestalled. 
 
 266. The natural progression of untreated hepatitis C is highly uncertain. 
See Douglas L. Nguyen & Ke-Qin Hu, Clinical Monitoring of Chronic Hepatitis 
C Based on Its Natural History and Therapy, 19 ENDOCRINE PRACTICE 292, 
293–94 (2013). But it is believed that 75% to 85% of initially-infected patients 
develop chronic infection and that, of these, up to 30% progress to cirrhosis (ir-
reversible scarring with varying degrees of liver failure). NEAL MEHTA ET AL., 
CLEVELAND CLINIC CENTER FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION: HEPATITIS C (2017), 
http://www.clevelandclinicmeded.com/medicalpubs/diseasemanagement/ 
hepatology/hepatitis-c/ [https://perma.cc/696D-FS56]. Among chronically-in-
fected patients, the risk of liver cancer is believed to be three to ten percent per 
year. Id. 
 267. The average charge for liver transplantation in the U.S. in 2017 was 
$812,500, according to a widely-respected employee benefits consulting firm. T. 
SCOTT BENTLEY & STEVEN J. PHILLIPS, MILLIMAN RESEARCH REPORT: 2017 
U.S. ORGAN AND TISSUE TRANSPLANT COST ESTIMATES AND DISCUSSION 3, tbl.1 
(2017), http://us.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/2017/2017-Transplant 
-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/SWM2-CPGG]. Health insurers typically negoti-
ate deep discounts from posted charges, but this average provides an order-of-
magnitude estimate of cost. 
 268. Cf. BUTTORFF ET AL., RAND CORP., MULTIPLE CHRONIC CONDITIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 13–17 (2017), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/ 
pubs/tools/TL200/TL221/RAND_TL221.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XQR-XNTA] 
(“Americans with five or more chronic conditions make up 12 percent of the pop-
ulation but account for 41 percent of total health care spending.”); National 
Health Expenditures by Type of Service and Source of Funds, CMS, https:// 
www.cms.gov/ (follow “Research, Statistics, Data, & Systems” hyperlink; then 
follow the “National Health Expenditure Data” hyperlink under the “Statistics, 
Trends, & Reports” tab; then follow the “Historical” hyperlink) [https:// 
perma.cc/2LG9-DEQY]. 
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Like many preventive tests and treatments,269 curative thera-
pies for life-shortening diseases increase medical spending over 
the long term by extending longevity toward health care’s “rag-
ged edge”270—a realm of debility that lies at the limits of medi-
cine’s capacity to cope. This is where spending soars, as we de-
ploy half-way technologies in dire circumstances, often to 
minimal effect.271 
On the other hand, the long-term shift we envision in the 
climate of reward for innovation will, over time, nudge even rag-
ged-edge medicine toward higher-value technologies. We’ll never 
come close to realizing the therapeutic aim envisioned by nine-
teenth century physician Oliver Wendell Holmes—the “one hoss 
shay” that functions flawlessly for 100 years, then suddenly fails 
completely.272 But diminished pursuit of technological change 
that yields low value at great cost on the ragged edge should 
moderate the burden of caring for those of us who reach it. 
Some growth in costs will be inevitable as medicine pushes 
toward the ragged edge. But growth that delivers commensurate 
value by adding to people’s productive and satisfying years isn’t 
a social or policy problem, any more than is rising spending on 
information technology273 or renewable energy.274 The aim of 
medical cost control policy shouldn’t be some arbitrary spending 
ceiling, but, rather, clinical costs and practices that produce 
value in line with the rest of our economy. 
B. SCALING ECONOMIC REWARD TO THERAPEUTIC IMPACT 
Two incentive systems shape the landscape of rewards for 
development of new medical technologies: (1) payment schemes 
for health care providers (including drug and device makers), 
 
 269. See M. Gregg Bloche, An Ounce of Prevention?, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 6, 
2009), http://prospect.org/article/ounce-prevention-0 [https://perma.cc/X4HS 
-ZAR9] (explaining how preventative medicine can actually increase medical 
spending). 
 270. DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE? THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PRO-
GRESS 63–68 (1995). 
 271. Thomas, supra note 256. 
 272. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Autocrat of the Breakfast-Table, 2 AT-
LANTIC MONTHLY 496–97 (1858) (collecting various essays, as well as the poem 
The Deacon’s Masterpiece: or the Wonderful ‘One-Hoss-Shay’). 
 273. See supra text accompanying notes 35–36.  
 274. See Brad Plumer, Clean Energy Is Surging, but Not Fast Enough To 
Solve Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/11/12/climate/global-energy-forecast.html [https://perma.cc/YE4T-B9TT]. 
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and (2) market exclusivity rules, including intellectual property 
protections. They are of varying relative import for different 
tests and treatments: market exclusivity rules, for example, are 
minimal influences on the invention of most surgical proce-
dures275 but central in drug development. To transform the land-
scape of rewards for technology development, large changes in 
both provider payment and market exclusivity will be essential. 
1. Toward Dynamic Value-Based Payment 
Calls to tie provider payment to clinical value have become 
high fashion in health policy over the past decade. But emerging 
“value-based payment” schemes276 don’t target future technology 
development. Rather, they reward doctors and hospitals with 
shares from the savings insurers reap when providers practice 
cheaply, so long as providers meet quality and consumer-satis-
faction benchmarks.277 The quality benchmarks these schemes 
employ reflect reigning standards of care,278 not relative thera-
peutic impact. They can be revised from time to time to take ac-
count of changing practice norms, but they’re not designed to fa-
vor large leaps forward over low-benefit advances. Nor do these 
benchmarks cover more than a small fraction of the services doc-
tors and hospitals provide. Today’s “value-based payment” thus 
incentivizes providers to stint on care without much regard for 
therapeutic impact.279 Moreover, it does nothing to channel tech-
 
 275. Associations of medical professionals have almost always taken the po-
sition that patent protection for surgical procedures is unethical, and surgeons 
have rarely sought it. Moreover, while surgical procedures are patentable, fed-
eral law bars enforcement of such a patent against medical practitioners who 
infringe the patent while treating patients. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012). 
 276. Bobbi Brown & Jared Crapo, The Key to Transitioning from Fee-for-
Service to Value-Based Reimbursement, HEALTH CATALYST 1 (July 28, 2014), 
https://www.healthcatalyst.com/insights/hospital-transitioning-fee-for-service 
-value-based-reimbursements [https://perma.cc/25P6-B5X6]. 
 277. Id. at 3 (describing the flow of money in a value-based payment system). 
 278. See Thomas H. Lee & Laura S. Kaiser, Turning Value-Based Health 
Care into a Real Business Model, NEW ENG. J. MED. CATALYST 2–4 (Oct. 24, 
2016), https://catalyst.nejm.org/turning-value-based-health-care-into-a-real 
-business-model/ [https://perma.cc/P9K9-HQL7] (“[P]ayers are increasingly bas-
ing reimbursements on the quality of care provided . . . .”). 
 279. Today’s “value-based payment” is thus little different from the bonuses 
and penalties insurers employed in the 1990s to press doctors to stint on care 
with minimal regard for therapeutic consequences. Market and legal backlash 
against these incentives rendered them unsustainable. See Bloche, supra note 
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nology development away from costly, “half-way” measures, to-
ward diagnostic and therapeutic breakthroughs. 
To transform provider payment into a tool for changing the 
trajectory of technological change, reconceiving value-based pay-
ment is essential. Rather than rewarding providers for stinting 
on care today or for adhering to quality benchmarks based only 
on current clinical standards, value-based payment should be-
come dynamic—scaled to evolving understandings of therapeu-
tic benefit. Ideally, scaling of rewards to results should be intro-
duced for all tests and treatments, but stakeholders’ settled 
expectations are a formidable obstacle to cutting payment for 
current, low-benefit care. So as a practical matter, we urge focus 
on clinical approaches that are yet-to-emerge. This elides the 
problem of vested expectations while targeting technology’s fu-
ture trajectory. 
A dynamic system of value-based payment would continu-
ally adjust payment rates to take account of the latest evidence 
of therapeutic efficacy. Fees could be assigned to new tests and 
treatments based on the evidence that enables their incorpora-
tion into clinical practice; these fees could then be adjusted peri-
odically, perhaps annually, as new data accrues. A model for this 
approach is “Coverage with Evidence Development” (CED), in-
troduced by Medicare in 2005280 to strike a balance between 
speedy adoption of promising technologies and avoidance of 
waste. Under CED, Medicare conditions coverage of new clinical 
approaches on continued collection of outcomes data, with an eye 
toward refining coverage criteria as evidence emerges.281 Cur-
rent law prohibits tying Medicare payment rates to measures of 
efficacy after coverage is conferred;282 we urge that such linkage 
be required for new tests and treatments. Initially-favorable cov-
erage decisions would then be accompanied by starter rate 
schedules, to be revised as clinical-outcomes data accumulates. 
The way forward toward this approach to payment is now 
open as never before. Advances in information technology have 
 
204, at 22–48 (discussing market backlash against such bonuses and penalties 
in the 1990s). 
 280. Sean R. Tunis & Steven D. Pearson, Coverage Options for Promising 
Technologies: Medicare’s ‘Coverage with Evidence Development,’ 25 HEALTH 
AFF. 1218, 1218–19 (2006). 
 281. See id. 
 282. Supra text accompanying notes 156–63. 
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revolutionized possibilities for tracking clinical outcomes and pa-
tient preferences, then formulating measures of value based 
upon them. Below, we offer a blueprint for doing so and thereby 
enabling value-based payment. But first, we turn to the case for 
transforming the law of market exclusivity in the health sphere 
into a means for tying economic reward to therapeutic benefit. 
2. Toward Dynamic Patent Protection 
Patents are designed to incentivize innovation by solving a 
public goods problem. It often takes substantial time, money, 
and effort to invent or discover a new way of doing things, then 
develop it into a commercially-viable product or service. This is 
especially so for medical technologies.283 Without patents, pro-
spective competitors could free-ride, profiting at innovators’ ex-
pense, by incorporating others’ inventions and discoveries into 
their own products and services after these innovations become 
public knowledge. To the extent that innovators foresee their 
creations will be copied and rendered less lucrative, they will 
forego research and development that might yield socially bene-
ficial products and services. 
Intellectual property law aims to compensate for this mar-
ket failure. It gives a patent recipient the right to exclude others 
from making, using, selling, or importing the patented product 
or process.284 It thus prevents copiers from free-riding on an in-
novator’s efforts; a would-be copier must obtain a license from 
the innovator (typically for a price) to make use of the patent-
protected idea.285 A patent thereby empowers the innovator to 
try to monopolize the return on her creation, encouraging so-
cially-desirable R&D that the recipient would otherwise forgo. 
Here, intellectual property law makes a critical assump-
tion—that purchasers’ willingness to pay for a patent-protected 
innovation is an appropriate measure of the innovation’s social 
value. Where this is the case, we can rely on patent holders and 
purchasers to settle on prices that yield optimal social benefit (or 
 
 283. See generally Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20 (2016) (detailing 
the research and development costs of several pharmaceuticals). 
 284. See 35 U.S.C. § 271. 
 285. Id. 
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a reasonable approximation thereof). For most products,286 will-
ingness-to-pay works reasonably well: we pay for them out-of-
pocket, and social consensus accepts our decisions to do so (or 
not) as measures of value. 
This rationale, though, breaks down for most medical spend-
ing. Third-party payment, consumer ignorance about clinical ef-
fectiveness, and expectations of rescue, encouraged by stake-
holders and supported by ethical tradition,287 combine to produce 
pricing and purchasing behavior out of line with medical tech-
nologies’ therapeutic value. Willingness-to-pay for patent-pro-
tected medical technologies is thus a poor measure of their social 
value,288 especially for rescue-oriented tests and treatments cov-
ered by insurance. To the extent that sale of a drug or device 
reaps rewards that exceed its therapeutic value, patent protec-
tion delivers a windfall that incentivizes waste.289 
In theory, the dynamic value-based payment strategy we 
urge above290 could adjust the pricing of patent-protected drugs 
and devices (and their associated clinical services) to approxi-
mate therapeutic benefit, rendering sales revenue into a good-
enough metric of social value. In practice, though, such pricing 
adjustment stands no small chance of falling short: political in-
fluence, administrative lag times, and legal challenges are 
among the potential confounders. So we propose to further in-
centivize drug and device firms to pursue higher-value R&D 
portfolios by moving to a value-based patent system—one 
whereby an innovator receives patent protection proportionate 
to the social benefit its invention delivers. 
This constitutes a sharp break with the established norm of 
one-size-fits-all intellectual property protection. But it recog-
nizes that markets for medical care are unique in the degree to 
which purchasing decisions are disconnected from goods’ and 
 
 286. Supra text accompanying note 37. 
 287. Supra text accompanying notes 37–43. 
 288. For medical technologies, one can reasonably equate therapeutic and 
social value, since externalities are small. (We recognize, though, that they are 
not negligible: both production and waste disposal can inflict environmental 
harms, and keeping people alive in states of severely-diminished functioning 
can impose emotional and financial costs on family, friends, and other third par-
ties.). 
 289. A classic example is the proliferation of “me-too” drugs that offer no 
marginal therapeutic benefit. See supra text accompanying notes 88–92. 
 290. Supra text accompanying notes 277–91. 
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services’ social value. And it adjusts for this reality by varying 
patent terms based on therapeutic outcome so as to discourage 
investment in tiny marginal advances and to promote R&D that 
aims for clinical breakthroughs. Tying patent terms to medical 
outcomes would realign intellectual property law in the health 
sphere with its intended goal: incentivizing socially beneficial in-
novation.291 
Medical information technology’s new capacity to track myr-
iad clinical outcomes and to value diagnostic and therapeutic 
measures accordingly makes this transformation feasible. It 
will, to be sure, add uncertainty to patent holders’ business cal-
culus. But this uncertainty reflects clinical and economic real-
ity—the impossibility of knowing in advance how human biology 
will respond to a new intervention’s various uses. To lock down 
patent terms at the start despite this biological uncertainty 
would be to make patent law into a waste-inducing insurance 
scheme, free to drug and device makers and paid for by consum-
ers via patent holders’ monopoly pricing. 
Had a value-based patent system operated in recent years, 
many of today’s entrenched, minimally-beneficial tests and 
treatments would not have been developed. Stakeholders’ settled 
expectations are a daunting obstacle to removing these marginal 
measures from medicine’s toolkit. But scaling patent terms to 
therapeutic results for innovations yet-to-emerge can dissuade 
firms from developing tomorrow’s marginal measures and en-
courage them to instead aspire higher. 
Some might blanch at the thought of departing from a uni-
form scheme of patent protection for all industries. But intellec-
tual property law is a means to an end. It presumes the value of 
innovation as assayed by market demand, then wields the crude 
tool of state-sanctioned monopoly to correct for the large disin-
centive to innovate that free-riding introduces. Where, as in 
medical care, market forces drive innovation in hugely wasteful 
directions, this crude tool needs some redesign to pursue the 
productivity for which it was intended. 
 
 291. See Alan Devlin & Neel U. Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the 
Utilitarian Foundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897, 914 (2009). 
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III.  BENDING THE ARC OF INNOVATION: VALUE-BASED 
PAYMENT AND VALUE-BASED PATENTS   
Law can’t by itself bend the arc of medical innovation. But 
legal change can go far toward aligning innovators’ economic in-
centives with therapeutic impact. In this Part, we offer a blue-
print for reform designed to fulfill the vision of value-based re-
ward that we set out in Part II. We intend this blueprint as both 
a demonstration of feasibility and a starting point for discussion. 
A variety of reform designs aimed at achieving this vision are 
possible: we make no claim to have devised the only options. We 
recognize, also, that further details must be fleshed out to turn 
our blueprint into reality. 
We begin with an approach to valuing medical advances—
an approach that takes into account an innovation’s multiple ad-
vantages and shortcomings. Our approach incorporates—in ag-
gregated form—patients’ valuations of these advantages and 
shortcomings, as revealed by their actual clinical choices. Next, 
we outline legal changes that would harness the enormous pur-
chasing power of public health insurance to drive a shift in med-
ical R&D toward investment with higher potential therapeutic 
payoffs. We then urge intellectual property law reforms designed 
to tie market exclusivity protections to clinical value. After 
briefly sketching an idealized value-based intellectual property 
regime for the health sphere, we propose adjustments to the 
Hatch-Waxman patent framework that governs pharmaceutical 
innovation to achieve much of what an ideal regime would de-
liver. 
A. BLUEPRINT FOR VALUING NEW CLINICAL METHODS 
A daunting difficulty besets hopes for basing medical prac-
tice on therapeutic efficacy—the elusiveness of knowledge about 
how well tests and treatments work. Prospective, randomized 
clinical trials have long been the gold standard for judging effi-
cacy.292 But their high cost, years-long duration, and narrow pa-
tient inclusion criteria have been insurmountable obstacles to 
their wide use in determining clinical value,293 and feasible, sci-
ence-based alternatives haven’t been available. 
 
 292. Laura E. Bothwell et al., Assessing the Gold Standard—Lessons from 
the History of RCTs, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2175, 2179 (2016). 
 293. Bloche, supra note 40, at 268–69. 
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Over the past decade, this has changed dramatically. The 
“big data” and analytics revolutions have come to medicine.294 
Electronic clinical records and interoperability of information 
systems are making it possible to compare the performance of 
tests and treatments in near-real time, for large numbers of pa-
tients.295 Potential confounding influences—effects on clinical 
results that randomization removes but that can wreak havoc on 
retrospective studies—can be factored out by sophisticated soft-
ware as data become richer.296 Possible side effects can be 
tracked, as can multiple measures of clinical success. These 
measures of success can be combined into metrics, or ratios, of 
relative value for clinical interventions. These, in turn, can be 
multiplied by dollar amounts to generate payment rates,297 and 
they can power a system of value-based patenting.  
Indeed, something analogous has already been achieved. Al-
most thirty years ago, Congress enacted298 and Medicare imple-
mented299 a so-called “Resource-Based Relative Value Scale” 
 
 294. Eberechukwu Onukwugha, Big Data and Its Role in Health Economics 
and Outcomes Research: A Collection of Perspectives on Data Sources, Measure-
ment, and Analysis, 34 PHARMACOECONOMICS 91, 91 (2016). 
 295. Harlan M. Krumholz, Big Data and New Knowledge in Medicine: The 
Thinking, Training, and Tools Needed for a Learning Health System, 33 
HEALTH AFF. 1163, 1169 (2014). 
 296. Medical, occupational, lifestyle, environmental-exposure, and other 
personal histories can be aggregated and analyzed as never before, dramatically 
enhancing clinical researchers’ power to discern causal relationships via retro-
spective study. See Travis B. Murdoch & Allan S. Detsky, The Inevitable Appli-
cation of Big Data to Health Care, 309 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1351, 1351 (2013). To 
be sure, these new capabilities carry privacy risks that will need to be managed 
effectively. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age 
of Big Data, 81 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 385 (2012). 
 297. These ratios can be incorporated into the full gamut of payment meth-
ods, from fee-for-service to outlays for different “bundles” of services. So-called 
“bundled” payment—designed to shift financial risk to providers and to thereby 
incentivize frugality—incorporates compensation for multiple clinical services 
into a single disbursement. Illustrations include payment to a hospital for an 
admission, payment to a medical practice for an episode of care (e.g., office vis-
its, tests, and treatments for an injury), and annual, fixed, per-patient payments 
to a practice for all services each patient receives. These methods are grounded 
in projections of expense for needed services. The value-based ratios we urge 
can be a basis for these expense projections. 
 298. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, H.R. 3299, 101st Cong. § 6104 
(1989). 
 299. Medicare Program; Fee Schedule for Physicians’ Services, 56 Fed. Reg. 
59,624 (Nov. 25, 1991). 
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(RBRVS), a set of ratios that, when multiplied by a dollar figure, 
yielded a fee schedule for physicians. The RBRVS was cost-
based—designed to take account of physicians’ effort, time, and 
practice expenses without regard for services’ therapeutic value. 
But it demonstrated the feasibility of basing rates on ratios 
meant to reflect value. 
1. Criteria for a Measure of Clinical Value 
To support a scheme of payment and patenting along the 
lines we urge, a measure of clinical value must meet three crite-
ria: it should be transparent (all should be able to see how the 
measure treats different outcome variables), multidimensional 
(it should incorporate multiple things that matter, not just lon-
gevity), and dynamic (it should evolve with changes in clinical 
methods, evidence of efficacy, and patient preferences).  
Transparency allows others to verify (or dispute) that a met-
ric is a reasonable indicator of what it purports to measure. It 
thereby builds legitimacy and trust. Multidimensionality cap-
tures the reality that patients care about many treatment out-
comes, including side effects, symptoms, and levels of function. 
These outcomes must be combined into a single metric—one that 
takes account of patients’ preferences300—to enable value-based 
payment and patenting. The import of dynamism is self-evident: 
technologies change, evidence of effectiveness emerges, and pa-
tients’ inclinations shift. 
2. A Model from Oncology 
An instrument designed to help cancer patients make deci-
sions about their care based on best evidence and their own pref-
erences offers a model for the metric of clinical value we envision. 
Cancer treatments, like therapies for other illnesses, can be com-
pared along different dimensions,301 including months or years 
 
 300. For example, if some patients with a particular illness are willing to 
sacrifice therapeutic efficacy to avert painful side effects, the metric should ac-
commodate this preference, weighted based on the fraction of patients who hold 
it. More generally, valuation of tests and treatments can incorporate aggregates 
of these weightings, derived from patients’ recorded choices. See infra text ac-
companying notes 301–11 (explaining the “net health benefits” strategy success-
fully used in oncology). 
 301. By contrast, it might be more difficult to measure the marginal social 
value of a new semiconductor material, or a new software program, since such 
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of survival, time until disease progression resumes, toxicity, and 
measures of quality of life,302 including side effects.303 The Amer-
ican Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) recently developed a 
framework to help patients and physicians work through these 
multiple dimensions of difference.304 This framework, which 
yields measures of “Net Health Benefits” for therapeutic ad-
vances, collapses several dimensions onto a single axis of effec-
tiveness. 
ASCO’s aim was to empower patients to make better-in-
formed therapeutic decisions, but this instrument can be repur-
posed to produce the kind of value-based ratios we propose here. 
The instrument works by awarding (or subtracting) points for a 
new treatment’s performance on indices of clinical benefit and 
toxicity. It employs a hierarchy of alternative indices of benefit, 
starting with a most-preferred measure, then proceeding to the 
next-most-favored option if good data for the higher-ranking in-
dex aren’t available. Scores for each index are weighted to reflect 
oncologists’ judgment as to how well that measure captures ther-
apeutic effectiveness.305 “Bonus” points are then sometimes 
awarded when an innovation greatly outperforms standard ther-
apy.306 The ensuing ratings are then adjusted up or down based 
on indices of toxicity.307 
For example, the most-preferred index for grading new ther-
apies for “advanced” (incurable) malignancy is median time of 
overall survival.308 The ASCO framework confers a categorical 
 
items might be used in a variety of settings with heterogeneous social impacts 
that are difficult to compare in an apples-to-apples sense. 
 302. See supra Part I.A.4. 
 303. Beyond their unpleasantness, side effects are also a leading cause of 
patient non-compliance; they thus affect treatment efficacy. 
 304. See Lowell E. Schnipper et al., American Society of Clinical Oncology 
Statement: A Conceptual Framework to Assess the Value of Cancer Treatment 
Options, 33 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2563 (2015) [hereinafter “Schnipper et al., 
ASCO Framework”]; Lowell E. Schnipper et al., Updating the American Society 
of Clinical Oncology Value Framework: Revisions and Reflections in Response 
to Comments Received, 34 J. CLIN. ONCOLOGY 2925 (2016). ASCO is a profes-
sional organization of oncologists with over 40,000 members. 
 305. Schnipper et al., ASCO Framework, supra note 304, at 2566. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Toxicity is tallied based on severity and frequency of adverse responses 
to treatment. Id. 
 308. For potentially curative therapy, the most-preferred index is a hazard 
ratio for death—the ratio at which people receiving the new versus the standard 
treatment die. If this measure is unavailable, next up is median time of overall 
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score (from one to five) based on a new treatment’s fractional im-
provement in overall survival, relative to the current standard-
of-care. If accurate overall-survival data aren’t available, the 
framework turns to median time of survival without disease pro-
gression (known as progression-free survival). Here, too, a cate-
gorical, one to five score is awarded, as is done (if good progres-
sion-free survival data aren’t available) for the index that’s next 
in line. But the indices are weighted differently to reflect per-
ceived disparities in significance: the overall-survival score is 
multiplied by sixteen, whereas the progression-free-survival 
score is multiplied by eleven (the third-ranking index is multi-
plied by eight).309 The resulting numbers are then adjusted up 
or down by up to twenty points, based on measures of toxicity.310 
The ASCO framework also makes room for patients’ prefer-
ences. ASCO plans to implement the framework via software 
that permits patients to give their own weights to different clin-
ical outcome indicators, enabling them to strike personalized 
balances among measures of longevity and quality of life. These 
balancing decisions, we note, could be aggregated, then incorpo-
rated into valuations for new treatments, thereby taking account 
of patients’ preferences.311 
The big-data and analytics revolutions open the way for 
greatly-expanded use of the ASCO model. Its developers envi-
sioned its use only with clinical trial data, but, as we will show 
presently, electronic medical records and machine learning 
make it possible to tap ongoing clinical practice to inform valua-
tions of emerging tests and treatments. ASCO’s framework is 
transparent, multidimensional, and dynamic—adaptable to 
evolving medical practice, evidence of efficacy, and patients’ 
preferences. We spotlight it here as a demonstration-of-concept. 
 
survival; then the framework turns to the hazard ratio for disease-free survival 
(the ratio at which patients in the new versus standard treatment groups sur-
vive without any evidence of cancer recurrence). Id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
 311. There’s an analogy here to economists’ use of wage premiums for dan-
gerous jobs to estimate the value of a life or life-year—these approaches incor-
porate preferences as revealed through market decisions. 
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Others, in oncology312 and other fields,313 have constructed anal-
ogous models for assaying value.314 General consensus is emerg-
ing concerning methodology; the next step is to employ this 
methodology to develop a comprehensive valuation scheme for 
pricing and patenting purposes.315 
3. Expanding the Evidence Base: Electronic Medical Records 
and Machine Learning 
Constructing a comprehensive valuation scheme is only the 
first step; the requisite information regarding efficacy must be 
marshalled to support it. For reasons we’ve discussed, random-
ized clinical trials won’t suffice.316 And the alternatives—retro-
spective and observational study of medical practice outside the 
clinical trial context—are fraught with selection bias and omit-
ted-variable bias that render it difficult to rule out confounding 
influences on study results. 
For example, suppose we want to study how cancer patients 
who are treated with a standard, inexpensive chemotherapy fare 
as compared to those who receive a new and pricey immunologi-
cal treatment. It’s unlikely that a given patient’s therapy was 
randomly chosen—for instance, less well-off patients with larger 
 
 312. The National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN) recently created 
“Evidence Blocks” that display five key features of cancer treatments: efficacy, 
safety, quality of evidence, consistency of evidence, and affordability. NCCN 
Clinical Practice Guidelines in Oncology (NCCN Guidelines®) with NCCN Evi-
dence Blocks™, NAT’L COMPREHENSIVE CANCER NETWORK, https://www.nccn 
.org/evidenceblocks/ [https://perma.cc/A7LD-KYK2]. NCCN’s attention to qual-
ity and consistency of evidence is a propos when multiple studies implicate a 
particular treatment or regimen. 
 313. E.g., Jeffrey L. Anderson et al., ACC/AHA Statement on Cost/Value 
Methodology in Clinical Practice Guidelines and Performance Measures: A Re-
port of the American College of Cardiology/American Heart Association Task 
Force on Performance Measures and Task Force on Practice Guidelines, 63 J. 
AM. COLL. CARDIOL. 2304 (2014) (proposing a system of value categories for car-
diac care, based on QALYs added by clinical interventions). 
 314. Some of these models include price or cost in their assessments of value; 
we’re not proposing to do so since we’re urging a regime that would set (or ne-
gotiate) prices based on therapeutic value. 
 315. We plan to offer more detail about such a scheme—and to demonstrate 
its viability by arriving at comparative valuations of emerging cancer thera-
pies—in future work for health-policy audiences. 
 316. Supra text accompanying notes 292–93. 
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copays might be more likely to receive chemotherapy, while af-
fluent patients with better coverage might more likely choose the 
immunological treatment. 
Given such differences, it’s misleading to simply compare 
health outcomes for those who received chemotherapy versus the 
immunological treatment. The individuals in the two groups dif-
fer not only in their cancer treatment, but also in their economic 
and social circumstances. If the affluent are generally healthier 
than the less well-off for reasons having nothing to do with can-
cer treatment (e.g., they have healthier diets and less stressful 
lives),317 then a naïve comparison of the two groups would likely 
overstate the relative benefit of the immunological therapy. 
In statistical terms, a patient’s wealth and insurance status 
are “omitted variables” that both affect her health and correlate 
with the treatment she receives. The standard approach to such 
confounding factors is to control for them when conducting sta-
tistical analyses. For example, in a linear regression framework, 
we could include a control for a patient’s wealth in a regression 
of health on treatment options. 
But what if there are other, unobservable differences be-
tween patients who receive different treatments? If we can’t 
identify and measure these differences, we can’t control for 
them. Large gaps and inconsistencies in collection of data that 
capture potentially relevant differences have historically frus-
trated efforts to compare tests and treatments by doing retro-
spective or observational studies. 
Here’s where electronic medical records (EMR) create trans-
formative opportunity. EMR include data on patients at unprec-
edented levels of detail and consistency,318 empowering re-
searchers to control for many differences that couldn’t previously 
be addressed. This is bringing us closer to the comparability 
achievable through the classic randomized trial—and EMR da-
tasets continue to become more comprehensive.319 
 
 317. See generally RICHARD G. WILKINSON, UNHEALTHY SOCIETIES: THE AF-
FLICTIONS OF INEQUALITY (1996). 
 318. They achieve this through comprehensive, consistent information-col-
lection templates; accumulation of data from multiple, connected health-care-
provider sources; and (increasingly) interoperability of different systems. 
 319. Martin Cowie et al., Electronic Health Records to Facilitate Clinical Re-
search, CLINICAL RES. CARDIOLOGY (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm 
.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5226988/#Sec7title [https://perma.cc/457Z-7CYK]. 
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EMR already contain rich data on millions of patients. To 
illustrate, current EMR oncology datasets include diagnoses,320 
patient comorbidities (e.g., whether a patient has diabetes, hy-
pertension or arthritis), complete laboratory test results, out-
comes (e.g., responses to treatment, tumor progression, and side-
effects), rich demographic detail, and medical and personal his-
tory. This vast trove of data is continually being updated as med-
ical decisions unfold and findings are recorded. Thus, we can 
track clinical outcomes in near-real time, for a much broader 
range of tests and treatments than could previously be followed. 
This explosive growth in richness and accessibility of clinical 
data has been paralleled by a large advance in computational 
science—development of machine-learning algorithms321 that 
empower researchers to discern previously invisible patterns 
within data. Increasingly, these algorithms can predict a treat-
ment’s efficacy (or lack thereof) by mining EMR data for hidden 
patterns in patients’ clinical pictures that correlate with efficacy. 
Machine-learning algorithms typically solve “classification 
problems.” A now-classic example is whether a picture includes 
the image of a cat. The algorithm first needs to “learn” what a 
cat looks like. It does so by “viewing” thousands of pictures that 
contain cats or non-cats and being told which pictures do and 
don’t contain cats. After the algorithm has been “trained” on suf-
ficient data, it is challenged to determine whether a new picture 
(not part of its training dataset) contains a cat. 
Over the past decade, machine learning has made large 
strides toward solving more complex classification problems. In 
the last few years, dozens of reports in the medical literature 
have documented use of machine-learning algorithms to diag-
nose cancer.322 A tool developed by Google, using a recurrent 
neural network (a common machine-learning algorithm) has 
achieved 99% accuracy in identifying breast cancer on pathology 
 
 320. In the oncology context, this might include, for example: date; stand-
ardized codes for type of cancer; histology and tumor grading; tumor location 
and metastases; degree of extranodal, lymphovascular, and vascular invasion; 
Gleason grades and scores, etc. 
 321. The term “deep learning” is often used instead of “machine learning.” 
The former is a subset of the latter and focuses primarily on deep neural net-
works, a particularly powerful machine-learning technology.  
 322. See Zilong Hu et al., Deep Learning for Image-Based Cancer Detection 
and Diagnosis—A Survey, 83 PATTERN RECOGNITION 134, 137–42 (2018). 
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slides.323 Similar pattern recognition tools hold the potential to 
project the population-wide effectiveness of new tests and treat-
ments by mining EMR data. These projections, in turn, can be a 
starting point for comparing innovations to standard care. 
In short, EMR data, augmented by computational science, 
can approach the comparability between clinical alternatives 
achieved by well-designed randomized trials. This opens the way 
to basing prices and patent protection for medical advances on 
therapeutic value. An attempt at proof-of-concept for this ap-
proach is now underway. We are working with a large medical 
data aggregator and leaders in oncology to develop dynamic met-
rics of value for several therapies for colorectal and breast can-
cers, using actual EMR data.324 
4. Leveraging Legal Presumptions to Encourage Comparative-
Effectiveness Research 
We recognize, nevertheless, that randomized clinical trials 
remain the “gold standard” for comparing the efficacy of tests 
and treatments.325 They, alone, can completely eliminate con-
founding influences arising from unobserved differences be-
tween patients who undergo alternate diagnostic or therapeutic 
measures. As EMR data become more comprehensive, this con-
cern should diminish in practice. But we can leverage this con-
cern—and the dismay of stakeholders whose products or services 
disappoint in retrospective or observational studies—by treating 
measures of clinical efficacy based on these studies as merely 
creating a legal presumption concerning value. 
Doctors, hospitals, or drug or device makers could then try 
to rebut this adverse presumption by conducting head-to-head 
clinical trials. Robust oversight of trial design would be essen-
tial: we’d expect some stakeholders to game the system by struc-
turing trials so as to yield seemingly-favorable results.326 A ser-
vice’s or product’s success in a well-designed trial would override 
 
 323. Jessica Kent, Google Deep Learning Tool 99% Accurate at Breast Cancer 
Detection, HEALTH IT ANALYTICS (Oct. 22, 2018), https://healthitanalytics.com/ 
news/google-deep-learning-tool-99-accurate-at-breast-cancer-detection 
[https://perma.cc/A52R-GNZ5]. 
 324. Our focus is on second-line use of antiangiogenic drugs (biologics) in 
metastatic colorectal cancer and use of everolimus in ER/PR +, HER2 negative 
metastatic breast cancer. 
 325. Supra text accompanying note 292. 
 326. Stakeholders could, for example, manipulate drug doses so as to make 
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its poor performance in retrospective or observational studies: 
the metrics of efficacy we envision would prioritize clinical trial 
results.327 An added benefit of this presumption policy is its po-
tential to motivate industry actors to conduct more head-to-head 
clinical trials, improving the evidence base for medical practice 
more generally. 
B. VALUE-BASED PAYMENT 
Neither federal nor state law can compel private health 
plans to pay doctors, hospitals, or drug and device makers based 
on therapeutic efficacy. But the sheer size of Medicare, which 
covers sixty million Americans,328 and Medicaid, which covers 
seventy-five million,329 gives these programs an outsized role in 
determining industry actors’ revenue expectations and, thus, 
their R&D decisions. The role of these programs, moreover, is 
likely to grow. More states are expanding Medicaid (and accept-
ing the ACA’s 90% federal subsidy),330 and the aging of the baby-
boom generation is powering a surge in Medicare enrollment. 
Moreover, there’s growing political support for a quantum leap 
in Medicare’s role: proposals receiving increased attention in-
clude making Medicare “buy-in” available via the ACA’s Insur-
ance Exchanges, lowering Medicare’s age of eligibility to fifty or 
 
competing compounds less likely to achieve therapeutic success or more likely 
to cause side effects. CMS, in our view, is the agency best prepared to perform 
the needed regulatory oversight since it has experience with assessment of com-
parative effectiveness for Medicare coverage purposes. 
 327. A variety of schemes for rating the quality of evidence have been devel-
oped by regulatory authorities and professional bodies around the world; all pri-
oritize well-designed clinical trials over retrospective and observational studies 
because of the bias problems we’ve discussed. See generally Nat’l Acad. Press, 
Appendix D: Systems for Rating the Strength of Evidence and Clinical Recom-
mendations, in CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES WE CAN TRUST (2011). 
 328. CMS Fast Facts, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (July 
2019), https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics 
-trends-and-reports/cms-fast-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/EAG6-HLQD] 
(discussing 2018 data). 
 329. Id. 
 330. As of February 2019, thirty-seven states (including the District of Co-
lumbia) had expanded Medicaid under the ACA to cover people with incomes up 
to 133% of the federal poverty line. Status of State Medicaid Expansion Deci-
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fifty-five, and even universal coverage via “Medicare for All.”331 
And even absent such a leap, these public programs’ large mar-
ket share will continue to make them a model for private health-
care payers. 
To harness the market power of Medicare and Medicaid, the 
statutory framework for these programs should be revised to re-
quire, or at least encourage, the scaling of payment for medical 
services and products to their clinical value. Ideally, this should 
be done for all that these programs cover. In practice, the psy-
chological obstacles and institutional expectations we’ve dis-
cussed likely render this transformation feasible only for prod-
ucts and services that have not yet entered into wide clinical use. 
Reimagined rate-setting along the lines we propose must 
start with an end to the statutory separation of price-setting and 
assessment of efficacy when Medicare decides whether to cover 
new diagnostic and therapeutic measures.332 Small gains in effi-
cacy could suffice (as they do now) to permit coverage; to insist 
otherwise would be to expose the strategy we urge to ferocious, 
likely fatal political attack as “rationing.” Pricing, though, 
should be tied to comparative-value metrics of the kind we de-
scribe above.333 
For fee-for-service Medicare and Medicaid—and for drugs 
and devices—accomplishing this should be technically simple. 
The Social Security Act (SSA), the authorizing legislation for 
Medicare and Medicaid, can be amended to require creation 
(along the lines we’ve proposed) and periodic revision of compar-
ative-value metrics for new diagnostic and therapeutic 
measures. Prices would then be set by multiplying the compara-
tive-value metrics by a dollar amount. This dollar figure could 
be fixed initially with an eye toward keeping overall revenues 
from the sale of clinical services, drugs, and devices unchanged 
during the first few years.334 There’d be winners and losers, 
based on clinical success, but the industry-wide impact of this 
 
 331. Tricia Neuman et al., Medicare-for-All and Public Plan Buy-In Pro-
posals: Overview and Key Issues, KFF (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.kff.org/ 
medicare/issue-brief/medicare-for-all-and-public-plan-buy-in-proposals 
-overview-and-key-issues/ [https://perma.cc/7QC3-TJZX]. 
 332. See supra text accompanying notes 156–63 (describing this separation). 
 333. See supra text accompanying notes 292–315. 
 334. This dollar figure could vary by locale to take account of regional cost 
differences—e.g., differences in labor and construction costs for hospitals in, 
say, New York City or San Francisco versus mid-sized cities and smaller towns. 
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transformed pricing scheme would be roughly revenue-neutral, 
minimizing the political and legal resistance that business dis-
ruption invites. 
For “bundled” payment335—e.g., Medicare’s disbursements 
to hospitals based on patients’ clinical diagnoses (so-called “Di-
agnosis-Related Groups,” or DRGs)—the comparative-value 
metrics we envision would need to be incorporated into the pric-
ing of each package of services. So, for example, DRG-based pay-
ment to hospitals for assessment and treatment of pulmonary 
embolism (a blood clot in the lung) encompasses a basket of ser-
vices (and products—e.g., drugs and devices) that CMS deems 
clinically appropriate. CMS combines projected costs for these 
services into an overall DRG “weight” (there are actually two 
DRGs for pulmonary embolisms with different treatment inten-
sities). The agency then multiplies this “weight” by a “base pay-
ment rate” (which varies by hospital, depending on local labor 
and other costs) to generate a dollar amount to be paid to each 
hospital for pulmonary embolism. Now, imagine that the best 
available evidence shows that a new treatment significantly im-
proves outcomes for patients with pulmonary embolism. CMS 
would then be required by statute to cover the new therapy, is-
sue an initial comparative-value metric for it, then incorporate 
the therapy (and this metric) into its DRG “weights” for pulmo-
nary embolism. Periodic revisions (based on tracking of clinical 
outcomes and patient preferences336) to this comparative-value 
metric would then trigger adjustments to DRG “weights.” 
When comparative-value metrics clearly show the superior-
ity of a new clinical approach over other options, use of the new 
approach should become a benchmark for assessment of the 
quality of care provided by HMOs. Otherwise, HMOs’ powerful 
financial incentives to stint on care (since they reduce their costs 
by spending less337) will selectively discourage them from cover-
ing those new approaches that are the most effective and thus 
the priciest. The quality measures that CMS uses to formulate 
its “star” ratings (from one to five) for Medicare HMOs should 
include these benchmarks, as should quality measures for Med-
icaid HMOs.338 
 
 335. See supra note 297. 
 336. See supra text accompanying notes 292–315. 
 337. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 219 (2000). 
 338. Likewise, these benchmarks should be adopted by the ACA’s “Shared 
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Detailed procedures for formulating comparative-value met-
rics, then converting them into prices, incorporating them into 
“bundled” payment schemes, and translating them into quality 
benchmarks for HMOs are beyond our scope here.339 We under-
score, though, that these administrative governance tasks 
aren’t, in principle, more complex than implementation of Medi-
care’s DRG and RBRVS payment schemes or pricing for Medi-
care HMOs. Congressional amendments to the SSA should 
sketch the broad outlines, leaving implementation to CMS. 
There will be interest group politics aplenty. But the absence of 
settled expectations of the sort we’ve discussed will reduce their 
ferocity and thus their potential to stymie pursuit of clinical 
value. 
Private health plans, we note, have historically embraced 
Medicare payment innovations, including DRGs and the 
RBRVS, as models. We anticipate that private plans would like-
wise adopt versions of the comparative-value metrics we envi-
sion, applying them to fee negotiation, “bundled” payment, and 
assessment of clinical quality, hereby increasing their influence 
on R&D decision-making. State regulators, ACA Health Insur-
ance Exchanges, and accrediting bodies could also nudge private 
plans toward doing so—or even require it. 
Tying pricing to best evidence of efficacy for new tests and 
treatments will incentivize innovators to incorporate high-qual-
ity comparative-effectiveness studies into the R&D process. To-
day’s near-total insulation of pricing from proof of efficacy dis-
courages investment in such studies, impeding therapeutic 
advance and encouraging waste.340 Moreover, empowering inno-
vators to challenge comparative value metrics assigned to new 
products and services by sponsoring head-to-head clinical trials, 
as we’ve proposed,341 will harness self-interest to accelerate ther-
apeutic advance. 
To accelerate transition of medical payment practice to a 
value-based footing, Congress could “sunset” existing, efficacy-
 
Savings” program for fee-for-service Medicare, which rewards groups of doctors 
for frugality so long as they meet the program’s quality benchmarks. Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022, 124 Stat. 119, 
137 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19). 
 339. In subsequent work for health policy audiences, we will make detailed 
recommendations about how this might best be done. 
 340. See supra text accompanying notes 117–61. 
 341. See supra text accompanying notes 325–27. 
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disregarding payment schemes for current medical practice. A 
“sunset” period of seven to ten years, or even longer, followed by 
adoption of value-based payment along the lines we’ve urged for 
new clinical approaches, might both soften resistance to this 
transition for existing services and spur their stakeholders to 
sponsor comparative-effectiveness research. But efficacy-based 
payment for tests and treatments just emerging or not yet on the 
horizon should be a higher legislative priority. It will transform 
R&D incentives while engendering less political resistance; 
moreover, extant clinical practices tend to “sunset” on their own, 
through obsolescence. 
C. VALUE-BASED PATENTS 
A value-based patent system would realign patent law with 
its intended goal: incentivizing socially beneficial innovation.342 
Awarding a patent is, in many ways, an unnatural act—an in-
tervention that upends an otherwise free market by bestowing a 
legal monopoly. Consumers pay for this monopoly through the 
heightened fees a patentee can charge as a monopolist. We allow 
patent monopolies because they are supposed to create more so-
cial value than they remove. When patent law fails to achieve its 
purpose, as it often does in the medical realm, its reason for be-
ing comes into question. 
A value-based patent system would repair this dysfunction 
by making returns for medical innovation merit-based. By re-
shaping incentives going forward, value-based patenting would 
steer firms from pursuit of low-risk advances with marginal 
promise toward projects with greater therapeutic potential. All 
who invest capital or effort into potentially patentable R&D 
would have enhanced motivation to press for clinical break-
throughs. 
1. A Dynamic, Value-Based Patent Term 
How might we give effect to this approach? Critical to doing 
so is being able to adjust the value an innovator derives from 
patent protection up or down, based on the innovation’s social 
value (for health care, clinical efficacy). The most straightfor-
ward way to do this is to adjust the patent’s term—the period 
 
 342. See supra text accompanying notes 283–86. 
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during which a patent owner can exclude others from using the 
underlying invention. 
Since 1995, the baseline term for a U.S. patent has been 
twenty years from the date a patent application is filed. In a 
value-based patent system, term would depend on the clinical 
efficacy343 of the underlying technology. Thus, assuming the 
twenty-year baseline, highly effective innovations would be 
awarded extensions (terms longer than twenty years), while 
marginally beneficial technologies would receive reductions. Pe-
riodic adjustments to medical patent terms could be made as ev-
idence of efficacy emerged—from ongoing observational and ret-
rospective studies as well as clinical trials. 
Like payment rates, variable patent terms could be based on 
comparative-value metrics. (These, in turn, can be derived from 
evidence of efficacy using models like the ASCO framework.344) 
Term extensions and reductions could be conferred along a con-
tinuum—e.g., by adding or subtracting one or more years to or 
from the baseline twenty. Alternatively, one could adopt a cate-
gory-based approach: by analogy to ASCO’s five categories of 
performance,345 patentable innovations could be placed into one 
of five (or more, or fewer) classes, based on clinical efficacy, with 
different patent terms. Detailed procedures for deriving patent 
terms from comparative-value metrics are beyond our scope 
here.346 This task should be simpler, though, than setting prices 
 
 343. Some might worry that our value-centric approach would give short 
shrift to so-called “orphan drugs,” which treat rare diseases. See 21 U.S.C. § 301 
(2012) (designating drugs that treat fewer than 200,000 people as orphan 
drugs). But we measure value at the individual patient level, not as an aggre-
gate of total value at the population level. Hence, a drug that, on average, 
greatly benefits a small subset of people would be deemed highly valuable in 
our system. As such, highly effective orphan drugs would, in fact, receive addi-
tional patent protection under our system. 
In addition, our approach would automatically address the problem of pa-
tent “evergreening,” where brand-name drug makers acquire additional patents 
“often of doubtful validity or applicability, in order to delay generic competition.” 
See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and 
Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327, 327 (2012). 
This is because such patents would be awarded minimal value if the marginal 
value of the innovation protected by those patents was also minimal. 
 344. Supra text accompanying notes 304–11. 
 345. See supra text accompanying notes 304–11. 
 346. We plan to undertake this in future work. 
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for health care: Medicare’s DRG and RBRVS payment schemes 
are far more complex.347 
Importantly, a value-based patent system need not change 
the aggregate economic benefit that patents yield for the health-
care, drug, and device industries—in other words, the system 
need not be “anti-pharma” or “pro-pharma.” Rather, a value-
based patent scheme can be calibrated such that the average eco-
nomic value of a patent is comparable to what it is under current 
law. 
The relative therapeutic value of tests and treatments will 
evolve over time as studies of efficacy unfold and new diagnostic 
and therapeutic alternatives emerge.348 A value-based patent 
system can take this into account by continually adjusting pa-
tent terms. As new drugs, devices, and other interventions enter 
clinical practice, near-real-time comparisons, using EMR data, 
open the way to dynamic patent terms—periods of market exclu-
sivity that change in length as relative value evolves. Such a re-
gime would perpetually offer the most protection to the highest-
value advances, encouraging firms to keep trying to “capture the 
flag” by pursuing clinical breakthroughs. 
2. Scientific and Competitive Uncertainty 
Some might suggest that a value-based patent system like 
the one sketched above would introduce harmful uncertainty 
into pharmaceutical and biotechnology development. This cri-
tique could take one of two forms. 
First, one might claim that drug and medical device firms 
cannot predict at an early stage which of their prospective R&D 
projects will be “home runs”—technological leaps forward that 
decisively (and hence, cheaply349) treat disease. Put differently, 
perhaps firms just “shoot in the dark” when they pick which pro-
jects to pursue.350 If so, then a value-based system won’t incen-
tivize firms to pursue higher-value projects, simply because 
 
 347. Supra text accompanying notes 157, 299. 
 348. Value depends on the time and place in which a technology is utilized. 
 349. See supra text accompanying notes 252–73.  
 350. For example, scientists might be confident that a firm is pursuing a 
pathbreaking new technology, only for it to fizzle in clinical trials and prove to 
be minimally effective or even harmful. See, e.g., Philip J. Barter et al., Effects 
of Torcetrapib in Patients at High Risk for Coronary Events, 357 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 2109, 2109 (2007) (describing increased risk of cardiac failure and death 
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there is too much scientific uncertainty as to what those projects 
will be. 
This concern is likely overdrawn. To begin, while any one 
project might be risky, most companies pursue a portfolio of dif-
ferent projects at the same time. Risk associated with a particu-
lar project is spread across the entire portfolio. Hence, firms 
have reason to be more confident in the average clinical value of 
a full portfolio than they should be in the clinical payoff from a 
particular project. A value-based system would encourage firms 
to pursue the portfolio that has the greatest overall therapeutic 
potential. 
In addition, firms almost certainly have some idea about the 
prospective value of the projects they pursue—if they didn’t, they 
wouldn’t pursue them in the first place. For example, drug com-
panies know ex ante when they are pursuing a “me-too” product 
that largely replicates what another drug on the market already 
does.351 So they know that the marginal clinical benefit of this 
product will be minimal, though the potential profits may be 
high. Even pursuit of clinical-breakthrough possibilities is un-
likely to be the product of mere guesswork. For instance, a firm’s 
decision-makers might believe that a proposed drug targets a 
new molecular pathway or has some other novel mechanism of 
action. Attempted development of this drug will be riskier than 
“me-too” R&D, but this risk hardly represents a blind leap. 
Beyond invoking scientific uncertainty, critics might claim 
that a value-based patent system would introduce too much com-
petitive uncertainty into technology development. A risk-averse 
firm might fear that its patent term for a prospective new drug 
will be reduced if another, better drug happens to be approved 
while its drug is still on-patent. This uncertainty could deter the 
firm from following through on the R&D needed to bring its drug 
to market in the first place. It might also reduce the firm’s future 
investment in other R&D, since its income stream will now be at 
greater risk. 
We partially address this concern through our proposal to 
phase in changes over a long-enough time to avoid impacting ex-
isting drug-development commitments. Beyond this, a dynamic 
patent term regime could guarantee that term extensions and 
 
in patients who received Pfizer’s torcetrapib, once thought likely to become a 
cardiovascular blockbuster drug). 
 351. See supra text accompanying notes 88–94. 
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reductions will always fall within a limited range. For example, 
if the FDA approves a drug and the underlying patent is then 
extended by five years, the patentee can be given binding assur-
ance that regardless of subsequent emergence of therapeutic al-
ternatives, no more than a year will be added or subtracted from 
the patent’s term.352 
Even so, we recognize that any value-based patent system 
will yield winners and losers—that’s part of the idea. But in the 
aggregate, value-based patenting would push pharmaceutical 
firms, device-makers, and other technology developers toward 
innovations that deliver more efficacy for money—without nec-
essarily shrinking or growing industry’s total reward. 
3. The Hatch-Waxman Framework 
The wholesale shift to value-based patenting that we’ve just 
described would require sweeping federal legislation. Existing 
law may offer a more pragmatic path to variable patent terms.353 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act) provides a starting point. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act enables a drug patentee to extend 
its term for some of the delays it incurs while awaiting FDA drug 
approval. This extension ensures that a patentee will have some 
of its term left after FDA approval; otherwise, a patent could ex-
pire before the FDA concludes its review. Without FDA approval, 
a drug patent has no commercial value; the patent merely per-
mits the manufacturer to bar others from making the drug. The 
manufacturer needs FDA approval to sell the drug to consumers. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act and its patent term extension pro-
visions are complicated, but at core, they enable a patentee to 
 
 352. Another way to address this concern would be to compare a drug or 
medical technology to a benchmark that precedes any technological race. For 
example, instead of defining the benchmark as the technology level that exists 
at the time a drug comes to market, the benchmark could be the technology level 
that existed at the time the drug developer filed its new drug application (NDA), 
or even the level that existed when it filed its investigational new drug (IND) 
application, prior to clinical trials. By defining the comparator in this way, the 
law could ensure that companies know the standard against which they will be 
measured and do not have to worry about intervening innovators whittling 
away their patent gains. 
 353. Under current law, a patent term can be adjusted for a variety of rea-
sons. For example, a term can be increased if the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office engages in unreasonable delays while processing the application. 35 
U.S.C. § 154(b) (2012). 
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earn an extension of up to five years,354 with no more than four-
teen years of patent life remaining after the date of FDA ap-
proval.355 This potential extension is tremendously important to 
pharmaceutical companies; indeed, drug patentees often make 
the most profit in the last years or even months of a patent’s life. 
Each day a patent on a blockbuster drug is extended might mean 
millions of dollars for its owner. 
We propose modifying the Hatch-Waxman framework to ac-
count for a drug’s clinical efficacy. This could be done in many 
ways, all aimed at rewarding producers of pathbreaking rather 
than marginally-advantageous drugs. Most simply, Congress 
could direct the FDA or another agency356 to establish perfor-
mance standards by regulation, based on input from leading spe-
cialist physicians vetted for conflicts of interest. These perfor-
mance prerequisites should require not merely that a medication 
outperform the current standard of care to be eligible for a pa-
tent term extension: the drug should do uncommonly well on one 
or more widely-accepted performance measures or achieve an 
uncommonly high score on a comparative-value assessment tool 
like the ASCO framework. 
For example, the designated agency could require that a 
drug for metastatic colorectal cancer increase overall survival by 
at least six months to be eligible for a Hatch-Waxman exten-
sion.357 Alternatively, an extension could vary continuously with 
 
 354. The extension is calculated based on two time periods: (1) a drug testing 
phase, which is the time between when a drug manufacturer filed an Investiga-
tional New Drug (IND) application with the FDA and when it filed a New Drug 
Application (NDA) after clinical trial testing; and (2) a drug approval phase, 
which is the time between when the manufacturer filed the NDA and when it 
received FDA approval. The total extension equals the sum of: half of the time 
in the drug testing phase (after first subtracting any time the applicant was not 
diligent) plus the time in the drug approval phase (again removing any time the 
applicant lacked diligence). 
 355. An example might help illustrate how this works. Consider a patent 
application filed in 2004, approved in 2007, and set to expire in 2024. If the 
underlying drug were approved by the FDA in 2021, the maximum the patent 
could be extended would be five years, up to 2029. If the drug were instead ap-
proved in 2012, then the patent could only be extended up to fourteen years past 
that date, to 2026. So even if the patentee would otherwise be entitled to a full 
five-year extension, she could only receive at most a two-year extension to 2026. 
 356. Among existing agencies, the principal alternatives are CMS and 
PCORI. 
 357. A more radical approach would be for the FDA to deny regulatory ap-
proval altogether for marginally-beneficial drugs. 
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the therapeutic benefit provided. To illustrate, the designated 
agency could award an additional unit of patent term extension 
(say, one or a few months) for every month of additional survival 
by comparison with the next-best or standard alternative. Con-
gress could also increase the maximum Hatch-Waxman exten-
sion, from five to perhaps six or seven years.358 
4. FDA-Conferred Market Exclusivity 
In addition to patent protection, conferred by the U.S. Pa-
tent and Trademark Office (PTO), the FDA has statutory author-
ity to confer a variety of “market exclusivities”—limited shields 
for drug-makers against generic competition. These exclusivities 
(also known as “data exclusivities” or “Hatch-Waxman exclusiv-
ities”) can keep generics off the market for years even absent pa-
tent protection. They, like Hatch-Waxman patent extensions, 
could be conditioned on showings of high relative therapeutic 
value, compared to next-best treatments—showings that employ 
the kinds of analytic and decision tools we’ve discussed. 
The details and oft-disputed rationales for these market ex-
clusivities are beyond our scope here. Our limited purpose in 
raising them is urge that they be leveraged, as law already “on 
the books,”359 to further incentivize R&D that pursues therapeu-
tic breakthroughs rather than marginally-beneficial safe bets. 
 
 358. An alternative approach would take advantage of the interaction be-
tween two FDA rules—its patent term extension rules for the “drug approval” 
phase (from the time a manufacturer files a New Drug Application (NDA) to 
when it receives FDA approval) and its rules related to priority review of NDAs. 
Under Hatch-Waxman, a drug patentee receives a term extension for the entire 
time the drug was in the “drug approval” phase (excluding time when the pa-
tentee was not diligent). See supra note 354. The FDA also currently conducts 
expedited “priority review” for drugs that appear to significantly improve on 
current treatments in terms of safety, efficacy, diagnosis, or prevention, thereby 
speeding up its average review time from about ten months to six months. So if 
the drug approval phase time were no longer included in the patent term exten-
sion (so that the term extension depended only on the time between the IND 
and NDA filings), then drugs that delivered greater therapeutic value would 
automatically receive longer extensions, since they would receive priority re-
view. 
 359. The FDA grants market exclusivities to certain approved drugs to 
shield them from generic competition for periods of time. An exclusivity on a 
drug prevents generic manufacturers from filing (and the FDA from consider-
ing) Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) on that drug—a step essen-
tial for bringing generic competitors to market. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (2012) (pre-
venting filings under Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act § 505(j), which 
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One might wonder why market exclusivities matter for the 
strategy we urge. After all, it seems likely that high marginal 
therapeutic benefits would trigger patent term extension, cover-
ing most or all of these exclusivity periods, enabling innovators 
to rely on patents to bar competitors. The answer is that branded 
drug manufacturers can wield market exclusivity as a legal tool 
for delaying would-be generic competitors from getting to mar-
ket even after protective patents expire. Branded firms can in-
voke market exclusivity, if they have it, to keep generic rivals 
from asking the FDA to authorize them to bring a generic ver-
sion to market.360 So preventing branded firms from obtaining 
market exclusivities for low- or marginal-benefit medications 
would enable generic competitors to get to market sooner, reduc-
ing rewards for play-it-safe R&D. 
5. America’s International-Trade Obligations 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), part of the WTO (World Trade Organ-
ization) treaty system, obligates the United States and other 
member states to issue and enforce patents “without discrimina-
tion as to the place of invention, the field of technology and 
 
governs ANDAs, and § 505(b)(2), another path to regulatory approval of a drug 
that relies in part on past safety and efficacy studies). ANDAs allow generic 
manufacturers to piggyback on the safety and efficacy data that a branded man-
ufacturer has provided, thereby lowering their costs and speeding up their ap-
proval time. An important market exclusivity from an economic perspective is 
the new-chemical-entity (NCE) exclusivity, which prohibits ANDA filings for 
four or five years after the FDA approves a drug if it is deemed a new entity (as 
opposed to an already-approved compound that is being reformulated). Another 
exclusivity applies to orphan drugs—those that treat conditions affecting fewer 
than 200,000 people: it prohibits ANDA filings for seven years after FDA ap-
proval. See 21 C.F.R. § 316 (2012). A third covers pediatric medications, adding 
six months of exclusivity after patent expiration for drugs with approved pedi-
atric indications. 21 U.S.C. § 355a (2012). 
 360. Branded firms can do this by invoking market exclusivity to delay ge-
neric competitors from filing a so-called “Paragraph IV” certification, by which 
a generic firm asserts that a branded firm’s patent is invalid or that the generic 
drug would not infringe that patent. If a generic company’s Paragraph IV certi-
fication is upheld, that generic company can produce the drug, assuming the 
FDA approves its ANDA. See 21 U.S.C. § 355a (2012). Indeed, the FDA gives a 
successful Paragraph IV claimant a bounty—a 180-day market exclusivity of its 
own to block other generic competitors. Market exclusivity gives branded firms 
the ability to freeze this process. 
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whether products are imported or locally produced.”361 An argu-
ment sometimes made against tailoring of patent rules to differ-
ent business-sector circumstances362 is that doing so runs afoul 
of this non-discrimination provision. 
This is unlikely to be a significant problem for our proposal. 
Most of the changes to patent-term extension that we’ve recom-
mended operate within the Hatch-Waxman framework, which 
has existed since the WTO’s 1994 creation without member 
states’ having taken exception. And Hatch-Waxman is just one 
of many industry-specific statutes in the U.S. and Europe alone 
that bear on intellectual property protection.363 Neither Hatch-
Waxman nor any other industry-specific statute has been put 
into doubt by a TRIPS challenge, and there’s no sign of such a 
challenge on the horizon.364 
Intellectual property protection has also assumed a growing 
role in America’s bilateral and regional trade agreements. A 
thorough review of this role is beyond our scope here, but, like 
TRIPS, these agreements have not endangered Hatch-Waxman 
 
 361. TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (emphasis added). 
 362. There have been a number of such plans. See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & 
David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (2013) (ad-
vocating for elimination of patent protection but arguing for sector-specific 
terms in the alternative); Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent 
Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 61 UCLA L. REV. 672 (2014); Neel U. Su-
khatme, Regulatory Monopoly and Differential Pricing in the Market for Pa-
tents, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1855 (2014) (noting that differential maintenance 
fees across industry categories could in effect create differential patent terms 
across industries). 
 363. Other than Hatch-Waxman, these industry-specific statutes include 35 
U.S.C. § 103(b) (2012) (biotechnological processes) and 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–914 
(2012) (Semiconductor Chip Protection Act). Europe has also enacted a host of 
laws specific to biopharmaceuticals. 
 364. Hatch-Waxman, crafted (with bipartisan backing) as a political compro-
mise between branded drug manufacturers and generic drug makers, retains 
broad support. While the Act has been criticized, a wide range of scholars and 
policymakers believe that, on average, it has been a success, providing a fair 
balance between encouraging generic drug entry (which reduces drug prices for 
consumers) and providing incentives for branded manufacturers to produce new 
compounds in the first place. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Dar-
row, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need a Re-Designed Approach for the 
Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 293, 346 (2015) (noting the 
Act’s “generally positive record of success”). 
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or any other sector-specific intellectual-property protection re-
gimes. Soaring medical spending and proliferation of low-value 
tests and treatments, moreover, are global challenges, heighten-
ing prospects for transnational receptivity to new thinking about 
incentives for innovation in the health sphere. 
  CONCLUSION   
Perpetually-rising health care spending is putting Amer-
ica’s financial solvency at risk, undermining our global competi-
tiveness, and reducing our standards of living. It’s also paralyz-
ing our politics and standing in the way of making medical care 
accessible to all. 
Efforts over the past half century to gain control over medi-
cal spending have uniformly failed. In this Article, we’ve ex-
plained why—and offered a diagnosis of the problem that breaks 
sharply with traditional accounts of regulatory and market fail-
ure. Our explanation focuses on the psychology, economics, and 
social norms that drive medical innovation and lock in high-cost 
clinical technologies that don’t deliver value. We’ve shown how 
both liberal and conservative approaches to the cost dilemma 
disregard these drivers out of understandable reluctance to give 
offense to people who are ill and afraid, to their loved ones, and 
to industry stakeholders. And we’ve urged that patients’ and 
families’ hopes and fears and stakeholders’ settled expectations 
be acknowledged, even accepted, as inevitable features of the 
health policy and law landscape. 
Accordingly, we’ve proposed an approach to America’s med-
ical-spending conundrum that aims to bend the arc of innova-
tion. Rather than focusing on today’s excessive spending, we 
seek to incentivize high-therapeutic-value advances and discour-
age emergence of low-benefit technologies. At the heart of our 
approach is the paradox that patients (and voters) become upset 
when health care payers or providers say no to marginally ben-
eficial treatments that are available today but don’t get angry 
about being “denied” transformative therapies that researchers 
will develop in the future. 
To change the trajectory of technological change, we’ve set 
forth a novel, value-based approach to both pricing and patent 
protection that would reward innovators in proportion to the 
therapeutic benefits that emerging tests and treatments yield. 
Scaling prices and patents to therapeutic value would represent 
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a sharp departure from current practice. Medicare and other 
public and private insurers set or negotiate prices with little re-
gard for therapeutic impact. Health care providers and drug and 
medical device makers do likewise. And patent protection is gen-
erally one-size-fits-all, without legal capacity to adjust to evi-
dence of clinical benefit. 
Tying economic reward to therapeutic value would counter-
act the often-greater risk of failure that accompanies attempts 
at clinical breakthrough. We show how this can be accomplished, 
using cancer therapy as an example and demonstrating that as-
sessment of clinical value can take account of multiple measures 
of efficacy, as well as patient preferences. Assessment of value 
in near-real-time, as tests and treatments emerge, has become 
feasible as never before, owing to the reach and power of elec-
tronic medical record data and machine learning algorithms. 
We cannot predict the precise effects of our proposed health-
care payment and patent-law reforms upon medical spending’s 
future growth. These effects will depend on legislative deals 
struck, regulators’ refinements, patients’ preferences, and 
health sector actors’ business decisions, scientific ingenuity, and 
luck. But for the reasons we’ve set forth, we’re confident that the 
transformation of incentives we envision will both slow clinical 
spending growth and dramatically enhance the therapeutic 
value that future spending yields. 
 
